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2. Abstract

This research analyzes the ongoing effort by Uber’s executives to prevent the

reclassification of the company’s drivers from independent contractors to employees. Through
rhetorical appeals made to customers, regulatory bodies, and drivers themselves, Uber’s
executives are attempting to cultivate a corporate identity that portrays the company’s labor
practices in a way that adheres to California’s labor laws, namely the “ABC” test for worker
classification codified in Assembly Bill 5, while maintaining the company’s ill-gotten reputation
as a bastion of Silicon Valley innovation. The success of this posturing hinges on attempts to
conflate Uber’s labor practices with equitable social outcomes, publicize narratives that
overemphasize and mischaracterize the benefits of flexible work schedules, and co-opt
consumerist terminology in its description of drivers’ relation to the company. This piece
embarks upon a critical analysis of these strategies, comparing the claims made in public-facing
corporate rhetoric with the actual power dynamics that exist between the company and its
drivers. If these strategies ultimately prove successful, they may provide a blueprint for future
anti-reclassification campaigns waged by Uber throughout the United States. Regardless of
whether AB5’s "ABC" test finds Uber’s drivers to be employees or independent contractors, the
decision will be reached with incomplete knowledge of the algorithms that govern driver
workflows, which are shielded from the public and regulators alike by intellectual property law.
To remedy this uncertainty, I argue for the empowerment of municipal governments to regulate
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Uber’s operations within their jurisdictions and for regulatory oversight over algorithms that
administer systems of labor.
3. Introduction
Through a combination of aggressive expansion afforded by wildly successful venture
capital funding, centrally orchestrated regulatory arbitrage and digitized systems of labor
administration, Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) have muscled their way into
ubiquity in terms of urban transportation. In virtually every major metro region in the US, these
companies have largely supplanted traditional taxi services, neglecting traditional industry
standards of service quality in the interest of maximizing customer convenience and economic
growth. In the pursuit of these aims, TNCs have relied upon and in the process popularized a
newfangled and considerably precarious form of employment commonly known as “gig work,” a
system that the Bureau of Labor Statistics defines as one in which workers are classified as
independent contractors and are connected to customers through a mobile app. It is important to
note that temporary and contingent work have been staples of the United States’ job market for
centuries, as many professions including musicians, writers and carpenters have long operated
under such arrangements. “Gig work” as it is discussed in this research, however, refers to the
refinement and expansion of these arrangements by infusing them with new technology that
manages and administers labor through a mobile app.
The potentially nefarious and exploitative aspects of such a system have been obscured
from the public and regulators alike through TNCs’ deliberate fashioning of favorable corporate
identities. These identities are primarily based upon the perceived inherent beneficence of
technological innovation and automation when applied to systems of employment, a belief that
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has held up against criticism until very recently (Hasinoff and Levina 2017). The research will
examine the case of Uber, which is the largest and highest-profile TNC, and its ongoing
multi-front campaign against the regulation of its labor practices via the reclassification of its
independently contracted drivers. Uber’s history of fighting these regulations, as well as the
specific tactics and strategies it has developed and employed to do so, exemplify the issues that
arise when, in a matter of a few years, a company becomes so financially powerful and
entrenched in the daily lives of millions of people that attempts at substantively reforming its
practices are met with stifling opposition.
From Uber’s inception, its growth plan has been deliberately based upon bad faith
interpretations and at times outright defiance of laws that stand to endanger all parties involved,
with the exception of the corporate entity itself (Edelman 2017). Especially vulnerable in this
system are Uber’s drivers, who are denied many of the traditional protections and benefits of
employment due to their status as independent contractors despite the considerable measure of
control that the company enjoys over many aspects of their work. To be sure, the efficacy of
certain aspects of Uber’s business model, namely the regular slashing of prices in efforts to
undercut competition and create “platform monopolies,” have been called into question by
detractors and allies alike (Rushkoff 2016, 92; Edelman 2017). However, the system of worker
administration determined by algorithm and delivered by an app that Uber has popularized is
becoming increasingly prevalent. Algorithms are defined as mathematical models that consist of
“a finite series of well-defined, computer-implementable instructions to solve a specific set of
computable problems” (Math Vault, n.d.). In Uber’s case, algorithms determine virtually all
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aspects of its drivers’ workflow, from fare rates to route suggestions, all with the intent of
maximizing efficiency and customer convenience.
Many types of freelance work - from digitally-based services like graphic and web design
to manual labor like home repairs and moving services - are increasingly orchestrated through
algorithmically-enabled, app-based services like TaskRabbit and Fiverr. Even many white collar
professions, particularly in the education and legal fields, are increasingly governed and
influenced by labor-facing algorithms (O’Neil 2016, 4). The common collective term used to
reference the growing number of economic actors that center their business models on app-based
service provision from independently contracted workers is “the Gig Economy,” of which TNCs
are a notable and foundational component. Corporations across industry lines find such a system
desirable chiefly because it cuts labor costs through its misclassification of workers and
performing the typical duties of management via algorithm rather than a human worker. The
misrepresentation of the company’s workforce and the nature of the worker-corporation
relationship, which has been achieved by the company’s effective utilization of corporate
identity creation, has for years assuaged the concerns of all but the most attentive and
empowered regulatory bodies.
This trend seems to have reversed, or at least halted, in the last two years, as judges and
legislators around the US have begun pursuing means by which to curb TNC worker
misclassification. California provides a prime example of such a shift in regulatory emphasis, as
lawmakers’ recent legislative attempts at reining in TNCs’ labor practices have been both drastic
and largely successful. This ongoing campaign has its roots in the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (Dynamex), a case
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wherein the state-recognized definition of independent work was drastically altered. The
Dynamex c ase, decided in April 2018, revolves around a man named Charles Lee, who worked
as a delivery driver for Dynamex, a company that specializes in same-day delivery and pickup
services for both businesses and the public (Kim 2018). Lee, believing that his work for
Dynamex was not truly independent, filed a misclassification claim against the firm alleging that
its actions amounted to unfair and illegal labor practices (Kim 2018). Not only did the California
Supreme Court side with Lee on this issue, it also redefined the standards by which all w
 orkers
are to be classified in California by refining the “ABC” test for employment first established in
the 1989 case S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (Borello) ( Kim
2018). Dynamex s pecified the “ABC” test’s definition of independent contract work, thus
making it more uniformly enforceable, by eliminating subjective phrasing that had long plagued
the efficacy of the test established by Borello ( Vega 2018). The refined “ABC” test established
in Dynamex includes the following three conditions:
A: The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the
performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact.
B: The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business
C: The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed.
While the Dynamex d ecision streamlined and simplified worker classification in
California, the manner in which it accomplished this goal - building upon and revising previous
caselaw - meant that certain obstacles to proper and uniform enforcement of the “ABC” test
remained in place. Though the California Supreme Court has “steadily adapted the test to capture
a true employment relationship as business models, such as the use of staffing agencies and
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contractors, have changed,” the fact that each subsequent change must come from a separate
worker misclassification case makes solely relying on the courts an inherently reactive mode of
regulation (Vega 2018). Further, the fact that these foundational decisions are subject to the
discretion of individual judges replete with their own beliefs, interpretations and biases tasked
with analyzing unique and often complex employment situations makes the uniform enforcement
of these standards unlikely if not impossible.
To mitigate the enforcement limitations inherent in the previous court-led regulatory
efforts, an effort to codify the refined “ABC” test established by Dynamex into law through
legislative means was launched in late 2018. This effort was spearheaded by State
Assemblymember Lorena Gonzalez, who authored, introduced and championed 2019’s
Assembly Bill 5 (AB5), a piece of legislation that would codify the Dynamex “ ABC” test while
simultaneously affording new oversight capabilities to the state’s four largest municipalities.
Though Gonzalez herself positioned AB5 as a bill aiming to curb the labor practices of TNCs
specifically, a characterization that was adopted by many of the media outlets that covered this
bill, its provisions stood to impact an array of California’s largest and most prominent industries
including trucking, entertainment and technology (Bhuiyan et al, 2019). The widely inclusive
nature of AB5’s provisions proved controversial, as numerous populations of freelancers and
independent contract workers - along with pro-business organizations, chambers of commerce
and TNCs - throughout the state vehemently opposed the legislation’s passage and bargained
tirelessly for exemptions from its provisions (Roosevelt and Faughnder 2019). Ultimately, AB5
passed both houses of the California Legislature and was signed into law by Governor Gavin
Newsom on September 18, 2019 with many classifications of workers including lawyers, real
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estate agents, barbers and freelance writers receiving exemptions from AB5’s “ABC” test but
remaining subject to the less strict test established by Borello ( Fishman 2019).
TNCs, with Uber chief among them, remain the most prominent and visible opponents to
AB5 and remain committed to either achieving exemptions for their drivers or overturning AB5
altogether. The fact that this ongoing battle is taking place in California - which is not only Uber
and many other TNCs’ home state but one of their main revenue producing markets - raises the
stakes even higher (Griswold 2019). Uber and its fellow TNCs’ response to AB5’s passage has
reflected the high stakes nature of the law - as they’ve spent tens of million of dollars on multiple
legal, technological and rhetorical anti-regulatory strategies and tactics in the few short months
since its passage.
In the process of opposing AB5’s passage as well as the law’s applicability to its drivers,
Uber has fashioned its corporate identity in a number of confounding, contradictory and
problematic ways. The aim of this research is to clearly define and analyze the problematic
aspects of Uber’s carefully crafted and uniquely adaptable corporate identity as well as its labor
classification practices that’ve been the basis of its efforts to avoid meaningful regulation. This
exercise is intended to shed light on the pitfalls of unchecked techno-positivism when applied to
systems that determine the material well-being of workers. The techno-positivist ethos, which
was predominant among not only Silicon Valley’s intelligentsia but the American populace as a
whole during Uber’s rise to prominence, is defined as the belief that unencumbered technological
innovation will inherently produce increasingly favorable social and economic outcomes on both
individual and societal levels (Morozov 2013, 6). In attempting to resituate the conversation
about Uber and app-based employment in general, the goal of this research is to empower
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workers and regulators alike to more openly and effectively question corporations’ attempts at
self-mythologization and mystification of their proprietary technologies to secure competitive
advantages. If left unexamined, the beliefs and assumptions that Uber promotes about its labor
practices will likely continue to harm workers, tie regulators’ hands and pacify public opinion.
This capstone project intends to hold these very beliefs and assumptions under scrutiny
by asking the following question: How does Uber’s corporate identity inform and shape its
attempts at preventing the significant regulation of its labor practices? Specifically, how is Uber
cultivating and utilizing its corporate identity in its ongoing campaign to exempt its drivers from
the provisions of California’s Assembly Bill 5? Beginning to demystify these tactics benefits not
only the regulatory bodies charged with objectively enforcing relevant laws upon Uber’s labor
practices, but also the public at large, who exert influence over these structures through both
their consumption choices and their decisions in the voting booth. This issue reaches far beyond
guiding consumption choices or assisting in the important work of government regulators,
however. Understanding the economic and social stakes of TNC driver classification in clear
terms unfettered by Uber’s own rosy rhetoric and overly-simplistic, self-serving arguments is the
first step toward creating a system that works to the benefit of the millions of people who work
within these structures. To understand the terms of this issue outside of the biased
self-characterizations of Uber and its fellow TNCs, we must first identify, dissect and analyze
these questionable and at times fraudulent characterizations themselves.
In response to the aforementioned research question, I argue that Uber has attempted to
prevent regulation of its labor practices largely through its deliberate creation of a corporate
identity that paints its business practices as far more progressive, equitable and ultimately
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pro-worker (or at the very least sufficiently objective toward them) than reality might reveal.
Uber’s corporate identity is intentionally amorphous and dependent on the goal the company is
attempting to achieve at a given time. When attempting to avoid the regulation of its labor
practices, as it has done countless times throughout its history but most notably in the last year
against California’s Assembly Bill 5, Uber fosters its identity through the weaponization of
driver and rider reliance on the company’s services, publicizing narratives that overemphasize
drivers’ alleged desire for schedule flexibility, and co-opting consumerist terminology in its
description of drivers and their relation to the company. Additionally, Uber has sought to
obfuscate the nature of its labor practices in the immediate wake of AB5’s passage through
multiple, contradictory anti-regulatory approaches including claims that the new law’s “ABC”
test for employment does not apply to the company and dedicating $30 million toward a ballot
initiative that would exempt the company from AB5’s provisions.
This argument is significant because it demonstrates Uber’s tendency to effectively
winnow down what are truly complex, multifaceted issues into solely the terms that paint its
business practices in the most benign light possible. By drawing attention to the key role the
company’s services play in many urban transportation networks, many drivers’ desire for
schedule flexibility and the company’s self-identification as a technology company rather than a
taxi company, Uber’s corporate rhetoric serves to obfuscate and diminish the many other
implications and impacts the company’s practices have on its drivers and society at large. The
issue of driver classification alone, which is the primary concern of this research, impacts a wide
range of policy areas including public safety, labor rights, corporate tax law and transportation
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regulation. To engage with driver classification on Uber’s terms, however, is to view it primarily
through the lens of rider convenience, systemic efficiency and schedule flexibility.
In order to fully explore the relationship between Uber’s corporate identity and its
attempts at avoiding the regulation of its labor practices, I will first discuss the economic
conditions and technological innovations that allowed the TNCs’ emergence, fostered their initial
growth and shaped their collective rhetorical ethos. I will then discuss the experiences that have
led me to focus my capstone research on Uber’s corporate identity and shaped my understanding
of the Gig Economy as a whole. To do so, I will reflect upon my past involvement with other
research on the Gig Economy by recounting my experiences as an intern with Jobs with Justice
San Francisco, a local labor advocacy organization. While my experiences at Jobs with Justice
San Francisco and in the University of San Francisco’s Urban and Public Affairs program
exposed me to a small portion of the research being conducted on the Gig Economy’ labor
implications, the complete array of past research that informs and influences my capstone is
rather expansive. A exploration of this body of research, as well as justification for how my
research findings complement and augment it, can be found in the literature review portion of
this capstone. Before delving into my research findings, I will outline the methods by which I
conducted my original research, the reasoning behind such methodological choices, and the
limitations that employing such methods entails.
The findings and analysis portion of this capstone contains four requisite sections. The
first, an analysis of Uber’s history of conflating its efficiency-seeking ethos with progressive
ideals and the company’s continued weaponization of riders’ dependence on its services, aims to
expose Uber’s proclivity to oversimplify and mischaracterize the implications and impacts of its
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labor practices. What follows is an in-depth case study of Uber’s multi-faceted and ongoing
campaign in opposition to AB5’s passage and application to its California-based drivers. This
portion of my findings sheds light on the ways in which Uber deliberately centers or
marginalizes the voices and experiences of its drivers depending on what is most beneficial to its
interests in a given circumstance. Third, I discuss the messaging surrounding the company’s
most recent attempt at circumventing AB5’s provisions, the “Protect App Based Drivers and
Services Act,” which is a 2020 California ballot initiative sponsored by Uber and fellow TNCs.
This portion of my findings points to the vast differences that exist between Uber’s standard
corporate identity and the messaging included in the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services”
campaign, ultimately arguing that this dichotomy diminishes the efficacy and authenticity of
both strands of identity. Finally, I discuss Uber’s tactic of co-opting consumerist rhetoric in its
public-facing descriptions of its drivers and communications made to drivers themselves, an
attempt at highlighting the subtlety with which companies like Uber can popularize fraudulent
narratives about their business and labor practices.
The final portions of this capstone focus on explaining the significance of my findings
and recommending policies that could address the issue of TNC worker misclassification. The
significance of my research lies in the fact that algorithmic management of labor is becoming
increasingly prevalent across industry lines. This fact, coupled with the pending success of
Uber’s strategy to combat driver reclassification, points to the possibility of it being co-opted by
other companies engaging in similar pursuits. Finally, the conclusion of this capstone includes a
summary of my findings as well as policy recommendations that call for more robust regulatory
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capabilities for municipal governments in California as well as government-led regulation of
algorithms that govern systems of labor.

Historical Background: The Great Recession and The Rise of the Gig Economy
No analysis of Uber’s rise, or that of the Gig Economy as a whole, is complete without an
account of the wider economic and sociological conditions in which this phenomenon occurred.
The embrace of such an untested and novel system of commerce in such a rapid fashion was a
response to a notable societal shift with technological, economic and social elements. On a
foundational level, the Gig Economy’s precipitous rise could not have taken place were it not for
a handful of key technological innovations that occurred over the latter half of the 2000’s.
Specifically, this period of innovative change hinged on four separate but related
innovations, the first of which was the launch of Amazon Web Services, or AWS, in 2006. AWS
is a cloud-based computing platform and application programming interface that allows
entrepreneurs and developers to build and host their software programs without owning and
operating the infrastructure that this process necessitates (Amazon, n.d.). In other words, AWS
significantly lowered the barriers to entry for software developers hoping to launch their own
startup business by allowing access to Amazon’s infrastructure on a subscription basis, which
was considerably cheaper than what would be necessary for fledgling businesses to do so on
their own. The second seminal technological breakthrough was the debut of the Apple iPhone in
2007 (Apple, 2007). While it was nowhere near the first smartphone to hit the market, its
introduction and immediate popularity marked a societal inflection point in which truly mobile
internet access would become ubiquitous to modern life. It was Apple’s unveiling of its App
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Store the following year, however, that truly unlocked the full potential of the smartphone for
both software developers and consumers alike (Apple, 2008). The App Store essentially serves
as a digital intermediary on which iPhone users can purchase and download mobile program
applications, or “apps,” many of which are designed and hosted via AWS. These three
technologies facilitate the creation, maintenance and distribution of cutting edge software in a
manner that is not only cheaper and faster than traditional computing, but completely mobile as
well. Coupled with the ongoing sophistication of GPS technologies that led to their compatibility
with smartphones around the same time, the technical underpinnings for an app like Uber to be
created were firmly in place.
While the aforementioned advancements may have provided the technological capacity
necessary for companies like Uber, AirBNB and Postmates to exist and flourish, their existence
alone does not explain their eventual reimagining into tools through which to administer work.
For such an explanation to be made, one must consider the economic conditions of the time,
which were defined by the Great Recession. In broad terms, the Great Recession was a period of
about eighteen months in which a collapse of the US’ housing market - which itself was caused
by the proliferation of subprime mortgage lending and the utilization of overly speculative
financial instruments - precipitated a worldwide economic downturn with myriad impacts in
different locales. Though the Recession was deemed officially over in mid-2009, its impacts
continue to be felt, primarily amongst society's most vulnerable populations. During this period,
the US’ unemployment rate ballooned to 10% and did not return to pre-recession levels until
2016 (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). Further, the total value of homes in the US fell by
30%, as millions of homes with subprime mortgages were foreclosed upon and the total wealth
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held by US households fell by a staggering $14 trillion (McManus 2010). Notably but perhaps
unsurprisingly, the US’ Black and Latinx populations felt the brunt of this crash, as they were the
primary targets of the very speculative lending practices that caused the Recession (Massey and
Rugh 2010, 629). Such dire economic circumstances, which are not even fully encapsulated by
most commonly-cited metrics, are highly likely to incentivize those impacted to pursue the type
of easily-accessible, temporal income sources that the Gig Economy would come to provide
around this time.
Aside from the Recession’s economic effects, it also deeply impacted the American
psyche. Sociologist Jennie E. Brand has found that unemployment fosters unsavory
psychological byproducts including a “loss of trust in society” as well as rising levels of clinical
depression and general feelings of shame amongst those impacted (Brand 2016, 359-375). Such
feelings were likely held by a rather wide swath of the populace, as a 2010 Pew Research study
found that ½ of all adults in the job market lost jobs or income during the Recession, implying a
much wider psychological impact than official unemployment statistics alone would indicate
(Pew Research, 2010).
During this period, a number of institutions considered to be part of the nation’s
economic bedrock - namely automobile manufacturers and banking institutions - approached or
reached financial insolvency. Such a rapid and jarring decline coupled with the aforementioned
economic and psychological stressors of rising unemployment and declining household wealth
likely compounded the crisis of trust noted in Brand’s research. To be sure, some of these
institutions sowed the seeds of their own demise, as they were the very actors whose actions
caused the subprime mortgage crisis and the subsequent dismantling of the American housing
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market. Rather than being able to take solace in the fact that those responsible for wreaking such
destruction would face at least some sort of consequence, in this case bankruptcy, the American
working and middle classes were likely further disillusioned by the Federal Government's
relatively weak, mistargeted and ineffectual efforts to guide an recovery from this human-made
disaster.
Such efforts began with the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, more
commonly known as the “Bank Bailout of 2008,” which provided direct relief for some of the
Recession’s largest and most culpable perpetrators including financial giants like Citigroup and
Wells Fargo (Collins 2015; “Bailed Out Banks”). Perhaps the most egregious aspect of this
legislation was its purchase of $700 billion worth of illiquid or “toxic” mortgages held by banks
in efforts to minimize the banks’ losses from the mortgages’ devaluation. Though the exact
amount that this bailout cost taxpayers in full is unclear, estimates of the Federal Government’s
total commitment reach as high as $16.8 trillion (Collins 2015). The logic behind this decision
was illuminated by then-Chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben Bernake’s “too big to fail” theory,
which posits that firms “whose size, complexity, interconnectedness, and critical functions are
such that, should the firm go unexpectedly into liquidation, the rest of the financial system and
the economy would face severe adverse consequences” (Bernake 2010). Though the logic of
Bernake’s sentiment is likely based on the fact that the global economy has become increasingly
dependent on the finance sector over the past half century, the message such a theory sends to
non-elite audiences is one of utter disregard and indifference. If the banks were considered “too
big to fail,” then conversely the middle and working classes were implicitly “not big enough to
matter.”
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Critiques of the 2008 bank bailout were widespread, as many argued that providing
economic assistance to the Recession’s victims would have been more moral and equitable use
of the funds that the bailout bill dedicated to buying banks’ toxic mortgage assets. Two
subsequent bills passed during the Obama Administration - the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 - sought to offset what had until that time been a thoroughly insufficient
and tone deaf recovery effort by directing their programs toward the protection of the American
working and middle classes. While the ARRA provided funding for a broad array of programs
aimed at stimulating multiple sectors of the US’ economy, its total expenditure of $831 billion
was widely seen as insufficient with respect to the goals it set out to accomplish (Congressional
Budget Office 2012; Ried 2012, Table 1). The Dodd-Frank Act was geared toward preventing
future recessions by reforming the financial services and banking industries through additional
federal oversight powers and banning certain kinds of overly speculative investments (Koba
2012). Thus, the immediate impact of Dodd-Frank as it pertained to the US middle and working
classes was purely psychological - a sort of vague reassurance that there wouldn’t be a repeat of
the Great Recession.
Their seemingly positive intentions notwithstanding, this slate of reforms was largely
insufficient as it did not adequately restore the material well-being of the US’ working and
middle classes back to pre-recession levels. This created a vacuum which private companies, and
tech companies in particular, began to fill by providing ways for people still feeling the lingering
impacts of the Recession to supplement their income in novel ways. The primary manifestation
of this response to the new economic reality was the Gig Economy, which allowed people to
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monetize things they already owned like their car, their home, their skills and their free time
through a digitally-mediated marketplace (Hogan and Torpey 2016). This novel arrangement was
well-tailored to thrive in the immediate post-recession economy that saw a rather slow decline in
unemployment after its peak. In fact, by the time that Uber launched its peer-to-peer ridesharing
service UberX in April 2013, the national unemployment rate remained at 7.6%, three percentage
points higher than pre-recession levels (Kalanick 2013; US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020).
Thus, we can triangulate the causes of the Gig Economy’s rise and current economic
function not as some passing fad or novel experiment, but through the lens of the technological
innovations that allowed its existence and the economic disaster that prompted its widespread
utilization.

Internship Reflection: Jobs with Justice San Francisco
My academic interest in the Gig Economy began when I participated in a research project
that was being conducted by the City and County of San Francisco’s Local Agency Formation
Committee (LAFCo) during the Spring and Summer of 2019. My first involvement in this
project was as a student in Urban and Public Affairs’ Research Methods class, wherein our
semester-long group assignment was to design and conduct pre-research on the topics LAFCo
was focusing its wider research project on. The class was divided into four groups, each with its
own topic to focus on: the impacts of TNCs’ labor practices on drivers, TNCs’ political and
lobbying activity, the geographic and logistical considerations of these companies’ operations
and best practices in terms of regulating TNCs. I chose to participate in the labor portion of this
project, as it most closely aligned with my interest in studying the intersection of organized
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labor, labor policy and the technology industry, which I had made the focus of many of my
previous assignments in the Urban and Public Affairs program. My pre-research group’s work
consisted of two types of qualitative inquiry, in-person interviews and a digitally-administered
survey, which were aimed toward gauging workers’ experiences and opinions on working as a
TNC driver. These efforts marked my first exposure to the realities of working in the Gig
Economy as they are experienced by gig workers themselves, an experience that grounded my
understanding of the contemporary labor market and exposed me to the complicated dynamics
that exist between gig workers and their partner TNCs. However, the constrained timeline of this
project and the limited resources at our disposal prohibited our pre-research from reaching the
depth and detail that my classmates and I would’ve liked.
Luckily, through my summer internship at Jobs with Justice San Francisco, I had the
opportunity to participate in the larger research project that my class’ pre-research had
contributed to and informed. Jobs with Justice San Francisco is a nonprofit organization that
convenes a coalition of over 30 local community and labor organizations around the goal of
building a strong, progressive movement for economic and social justice locally and nationally.
Due to its extensive connections to local networks of workers, advocates and working class
communities in general, Jobs with Justice was contracted by San Francisco LAFCo to assist in
various aspects of its Gig Economy study, namely driver and community outreach and survey
administration. The more technical aspects of the survey design and quantitative data analysis
were performed by UC Santa Cruz professor and labor researcher Chris Benner. This
collaborative effort between San Francisco LAFCo, Jobs with Justice and Professor Benner
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resulted in a widely inclusive study designed to gauge how gig workers are faring in the current
(pre-AB5) system financially, physically, psychologically, and logistically.
My personal involvement with this study primarily included conducting outreach to Bay
Area-based gig workers, namely Uber and Lyft drivers. The goal of this outreach was to
encourage these workers to attend focus groups that the research team had planned as the final
step in the pre-research process which would inform the contents of the final gig worker survey.
Due to the lack of central physical locations for drivers to congregate throughout their work
days, I conducted this outreach both on and offline. The online outreach was conducted through
driver forums and social media pages, a tactic that I utilized again during research for this
capstone project. Once I was permitted entry into these online spaces - which usually entailed
explaining my intentions and affiliations with group administrators - I began sending out a
carefully crafted message describing the research study as a whole and its underlying goals while
extending the offer for those interested to attend the upcoming focus groups. In this message, I
was sure to emphasize that the research group was in no way affiliated with any TNCs, was
approaching the research with minimal bias, and would treat the maintenance of respondent
anonymity with the utmost care. In addition to this outreach, I was tasked with monitoring the
activity of these groups in order to ascertain the aspects of gig work that drivers most commonly
discussed and thus were most salient to our survey. The posts on such forums and social media
pages run the gamut from complaints about ill-behaved passengers to questions regarding
income tax filing protocol, providing a surprisingly comprehensive look into the complexities
and eccentricities of working in the Gig Economy.
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Conducting offline outreach proved markedly more difficult but ultimately yielded
pleasing results. Due to the aforementioned decentralized nature of gig work and the lack of
officially-recognized or widely known places for drivers to congregate during their workday,
finding the proper areas to conduct offline outreach was perhaps the most difficult aspect of this
process. My fellow researchers and I first attempted to approach drivers at highly-trafficked gas
stations throughout San Francisco, but the infrequency with which drivers visited such stations
combined with the relatively short amount of time they typically spend at stations rendered this
approach largely ineffective. We then focused our outreach on large parking lots in the
immediate vicinity of the San Francisco and Oakland airports, which we had heard large groups
of Uber and Lyft drivers populate while waiting to be assigned rides to pick people up from these
airports. The nature of drivers’ presence at these makeshift staging lots eliminated many of the
problematic aspects of approaching drivers at gas stations, namely the time constraints associated
with gas station visits. This approach proved to be rather successful, as just under half of the
drivers that ultimately attended the focus groups were initially contacted at these locations.
While these attempts at in-person gig worker outreach were productive in terms of
boosting focus group attendance, they figured just as prominently in the development of my
political communication skills as well as my knowledge of the Gig Economy as a whole. Though
my colleagues and I wrote and practiced a “rap,” or outreach script before contacting drivers
directly, the one-off nature of such conversations forced me to think critically and alter my
inquiries and appeals in real-time. While conversing with drivers did require a considerable
amount of background knowledge on the Gig Economy, approaching these conversations which cover personal and politicized subjects - with adequate respect and compassion for the
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perspectives shared by drivers proved to be the key to successful outreach. Exposure to drivers’
actual thoughts, uncertainties and concerns regarding their work forced me to consider the Gig
Economy in a more nuanced manner, as the wide range of experiences and perspectives I
encountered challenged my initial notion that all drivers experience and relate to the system they
work within in a similar way. Ultimately, this experience compounded my understanding of
many aspects of the Gig Economy - the immense power and informational imbalances that exist
between TNCs and their workers, the issues and complexities that regulating such an industry
entails, the contentious nature of the driver classification issue - in a way that sparked my interest
and led to me centering my capstone on Uber, the Gig Economy’s most prominent and powerful
corporation.
Upon the completion of my internship at Jobs with Justice, I received a gift from the
organization’s executive director. The gift was a book - Alex Rosenblat’s Uberland: How
Algorithms are Rewriting the Rules of Work - and its contents would propel my understanding of
the Gig Economy toward the formulation of my research question. I left this internship with a
lingering confusion regarding how companies like Uber were able to get away with
misclassifying their workers and disobeying livery laws for years on end. During this internship
I’d noticed a cavernous divergence between the public perception and actual practices of
companies like Uber, and wanted to investigate how the company presents its labor systems to
the public, to drivers and to regulators - what narratives they try to push, what they say drivers
want - in comparison to the actual facts about their systems of labor as told to me by drivers.
Rosenblat’s discussion of Uber’s use of algorithmic management to obscure the levers of control

26
it enjoys over its drivers’ actions in Uberland began to explain this phenomenon from a
technological perspective.
While this explanation partially satiated my interest and underlying confusion, as it
discussed the underpinning technology that makes this system palatable for drivers, it did not
completely engage with how this system is sold to customers, regulators and the public at large.
This lingering interest drew me to the concept of corporate identity, which entails many aspects
of a company’s public-facing efforts including advertising, formal communications and
organizational behavioral patterns, as a vehicle through which to further analyze Uber’s
avoidance of labor regulation on my own accord. It was during this time that I began to notice
different threads of research being produced that were related to the topic of my interest,
including the LAFCo study concerning drivers’ well-being and Rosenblat’s research on
algorithmic management in particular. These threads, as well as a number of older sources that
underpin and inform contemporary inquiries into the Gig Economy, are explored in detail in the
following literature review.

3. Literature Review
This literature review addresses four distinct but interrelated bodies of literature: works
on the role of technology in society, on corporate identity, on Uber’s corporate leadership, and
on precarious work in the United States. In order to gain sufficient context regarding the ideals
and assumptions that underpin Uber’s corporate identity, it is important to track both the
economic implications of internet-based technology and how popular conceptions of the
appropriate role of technology in society have evolved over time. As technologies developed
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during the immediate postwar era and into the 1970’s have become ubiquitous, some scholars
argue that the ideologies and worldviews held by those who created such technologies have, both
implicitly and explicitly, become increasingly prominent as well. Entrepreneurial and
institutional actors alike have co-opted these technologies for myriad applications as they have
become increasingly sophisticated and their societal presence normalized. One such co-optation
that is particularly relevant to this research is that of systems of labor administration. While one
cohort of scholars has lauded this infusion of technology into the workplace for its theoretical
potential to democratize and decentralize what they feel has become detrimentally retrograde and
hierarchical system of labor relations, others have adopted a more skeptical point of view, noting
that technological progress does not necessarily address structural imbalances of power. In order
to fully understand the contentions surrounding the technologization of systems of labor
administration, however, one must first examine the technology industry’s ideological
underpinnings.

a. Technology’s Role in Society
When researching an industry that is as defined by its idiosyncrasies and willingness to
break with tradition as the tech industry, one may not expect to find a wider ethos that unites its
representative companies’ goals, ideals and visions of progress. However, there is wide
agreement among scholars and experts that Silicon Valley’s most influential actors share such a
view - that an unwavering faith in the power of innovation and an unrelenting pursuit of
efficiency will lead to increasingly positive economic, ecological and social outcomes (Hasinoff,
Turner, Hill, Morozov). In his foundational work From Counterculture to Cyberculture, F
 red
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Turner traces the development of this ethos from its roots in the countercultural 1960’s “Whole
Earth Network” movement to its current place within the c-suites of Fortune 500 corporations,
centering his inquiry on the “Whole Earth Network’s” creator, Stewart Brand.
According to Turner, “Between the 1960’s and 1990’s, Brand assembled a network of
people and publications that together brokered a series of encounters between bohemian San
Francisco and the emerging technology hub of Silicon Valley to its south,” which ultimately led
to the “complex intertwining of two cultural forces: the military-industrial research culture which
thrived in the Cold War, and the American counterculture” (Turner 2006, 3). Turner calls what
resulted from Brand’s grand experiment “techno-utopianism,” or a blend of the “free-wheeling,
interdisciplinary and highly entrepreneurial style of work” being fostered in the US
military-industrial sector and the countercultural belief that “traditional political mechanisms for
creating social change had become bankrupt” (Turner 2006, 4). Thus, Turner claims, a new
“cybernetic” view of the world, one in which “material reality could be reimagined as an
information system,” was popularized amongst “a generation that had grown up in a world beset
by massive armies and the threat of nuclear holocaust” (Turner 2006, 5).
This generation, which found comfort and even the possibility of global harmony in “the
cybernetic vision of the globe as a single, interlinked pattern of information,” would eventually
become Silicon Valley’s most influential spiritual and corporate leaders (Turner 2006, 5). This
future, however, seemed far from Brand and his collaborators’ minds when they created the
“Whole Earth ‘Lectronic Link” (WELL), which is one of the earliest examples of a public-facing
internet. Essentially an online community bulletin board system to facilitate communication
between “Whole Earth Network” members, WELL’s animating purpose was community service
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rather than any potential corporate applications. It was only as these technologies developed to
the point where their applicability to corporate endeavors became readily apparent that we began
to see such technologies drive massive wealth creation and, eventually, inequality.
While Turner’s work focuses on the process by which “techno-utopian” ideology spread
within and was shaped by the groups that would eventually foster Silicon Valley’s elite, Manuel
Castells’ Rise of the Network Society analyzes this phenomenon on a societal level. According to
Castells, despite the apolitical and individualistic nature of ideological movements like the
“Whole Earth Network,” the technologies that emerged from such movements must be
considered within the context of their relationships with society at large. This is partially due to
the “decisive role of military funding and markets in fostering early stages of the electronics
industry during the 1940-60s,” but, more fundamentally, the role that technological innovation
has played in different societies’ developmental trajectories throughout history (Castells 2000,
5). Without going so far as claiming that technological innovation alone drives societal
progression, Castells posits that it “embodies the capacity of societies to transform themselves,
as well as the uses to which societies, always in a conflictive process, decide to put their
technological potential” (Castells 2000, 7). The primary example that Castells uses to illustrate
this point is the “Information Technology Revolution” that occurred during the 1970’s as a result
of the Keynesian postwar industrial economy’s failure to continue to produce growth, which, in
addition to shifting away from industrial production and toward a service and information-based
economy, “prompted a wholesale reorganization which included: deregulation, privatization, and
the dismantling of the social contract between capital and labor” (Castells 2000, 13). This theory
places Brand’s “cybernetic vision of the world,” despite its chief proponents’ disinterest and
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disregard for traditional structures of power, as the very ideology that allowed this world-altering
economic shift to take place, ironically making Brand and a number of his colleagues rather
wealthy and powerful as a result.
Such unwavering belief in the inherent beneficence of technological progress, aside from
precipitating the sort of macro-level economic and social changes outlined in Castells’ work,
may lead to overly deterministic and binary conceptions of technology’s role in society as well.
This view is exemplified in Evgeny Morozov’s To Save Everything, Click Here, which centers
its analysis on the concept of “technological solutionism.” Operating as a dangerous but not
unnatural conclusion drawn from the narratives popularized by the “Whole Earth Network” and
contemporary tech evangelists, “technological solutionism” is defined by Morozov as “recasting
all complex social situations either as neatly defined problems with definite, computable
solutions or as transparent and self evident processes that can be easily optimized - if only the
right algorithms are in place - this quest is likely to have unexpected consequences that could
eventually cause more damage than the problems they seek to address” (Morozov 2013, 5). Chief
among the pitfalls of treating all societal issues as distinct problems with singular technological
solutions is the incongruity that Morozov claims exists between the end goals that technological
advancements are designed to pursue - namely efficiency and speed - with the intended outcomes
of various pre-existing societal structures. To this end, Morozov states that “a deeper
investigation into the very nature of these problems would reveal that the inefficiency,
ambiguity, opacity - whether in politics or everyday life - that the newly empowered geeks and
solutionists are rallying against are not in any sense problematic. Quite the opposite: these vices
are often virtues in disguise” (Morozov 2013, 6). In other words, Morozov argues that proposed

31
technological solutions to societal issues are able to pursue improvement only through gains in
efficiency and, in turn, are unable to account for any unrelated benefits that an inefficient,
opaque, or ambiguous system may include. This application of Capitalist, efficiency-seeking
value structures to systems traditionally incentivized and informed by ideals like stability, equity
or tradition, Morozov argues, has produced far less favorable societal outcomes than the
“techno-utopian” ethos would lead us to believe.
While Morozov’s thesis addresses the application of “technological solutionism” to many
aspects of society, Ted Striphas’ Algorithmic Culture compliments Morozov’s thesis through its
focus on the dangers of applying such logic to processes of cultural production. What makes
Striphas’ analysis truly important to this conversation is his poignant description of “the work of
culture” as “the sorting, classifying and hierarchizing of people, places, objects and ideas”
(Striphas 2015, 406). Striphas notes that the delegation of this work to algorithms and
mathematical models shifts the way that culture has traditionally been produced in a way that is
dehumanized and decontextualized, which he ultimately posits will “privatize the process”
(Striphas 2015, 406). To Striphas, culture and its production are inherently social processes
created by “ongoing struggle to determine the values, practices and artifacts—the culture, as it
were—of specific social groups” (Striphas 2015, 406). Despite Morozov and Striphas’ warnings
about the dangerous outcomes a systematically optimized culture might produce, there have been
many who champion the role it can play in democratizing and decentralizing the Economy.
This school of thought is based on Coasian Firm Theory, which posits that economic
actors will choose to align themselves in ways that minimize the transaction costs associated
with their enterprise. Traditionally, this theory has been used as justification for the existence of
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firms, as they are seen as more efficient facilitators of commerce than individuals operating
within a marketplace (Coase 1937, 389). As algorithmic technology has become increasingly
sophisticated, scholars have begun to consider its application to economic relationships in
similarly Coasian terms, positing that algorithmically-administered commerce further reduces
transaction costs. This is the precise position Yochai Benkler takes in his 2002 piece “Coase’s
Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm,” which outlines the virtues of such a shift toward
decentralized, socially reciprocal and algorithmically-administered commerce far before the
dawn of the gig economy as we know it today. Specifically, Benkler notes that this system is
preferable because it is better at “identifying and assigning human capital to information and
cultural production processes” and thus decreases inefficiencies inherent to the traditional firm
and market-based Capitalist structure (Benkler 2002, 399). In the roughly two decades since
Benkler’s piece was published, his thesis has been reiterated and expanded upon as algorithmic
technology has become more widely adopted throughout different sectors of the economy,
arguably reaching a fever pitch during the advent of the Gig Economy.
One such piece that exists in Benkler’s shadow is Juliet Schor and Connor Fitzmaurice’s
Collaborating and Collecting. Situating their analysis within the context of the Great Recession,
a period of transformational economic uncertainty and job precarity, Schor and Fitzmaurice note
that many young people have responded to these economic conditions by seeking to secure
themselves through what they call “connected consumption,” or relying on electronically
mediated peer-to-peer transactions rather than traditional market actors to mediate exchanges
(Fitzmaurice and Schor 2015, 3). This shift away from reliance upon traditional market actors is
understandable in the aftermath of a financial crisis that saw some of the world’s most
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entrenched and valuable corporations and institutions crumble. However, Schor and Fitzmaurice
make sure to temper expectations of this system’s ability to foster economic justice by
suggesting that “the market orientation and organization of sharing economy platforms—as well
as whether exchanges are monetized or non monetized—are critical characteristics shaping these
platforms and their potential to provide truly alternative economic arrangements” (Fitzmaurice
and Schor 2015, 3). Essentially, Schor and Fitzmaurice argue that this system’s transformative
potential rests in its application as a technologically-aided barter system amongst actors of
relatively equal power, thus also serving as a warning against its co-optation by profit driven
actors - be they entrepreneurial or institutional. Though well-intentioned, such a warning rings
somewhat hollow when made within the contemporary market capitalist context, wherein the
kinds of equal power dynamics championed by Schor and Fitzmaurice rarely, if ever, exist for
long.
The very sort of co-optation and corporatization that Schor and Fitzmaurice warn against
is the primary theme of Alex Rosenblat and Ryan Calo’s The Taking Economy, which uses Uber
as an avatar of the tech industry’s repurposing of such decentralized, reciprocal systems of
exchange. This piece focuses on Uber’s utilization of the term “The Sharing Economy” to
describe and frame its then-novel peer-to-peer, app based mobility services. Rosenblat and Calo
argue that this frame, although openly accepted by mainstream media and governmental actors
for some time, was deliberately co-opted and utilized by Uber’s executives in efforts to paint
their austere and exploitative practices as being based in social reciprocity and trust facilitated
via an app (Calo and Rosenblat 2017, 1637). Although it was immediately clear to anyone
remotely familiar with Uber’s business model that nothing was being “shared” in these
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transactions, Uber was able to champion this terminology and its underlying assumptions for an
ultimately short but nonetheless crucial period of time in which its financial might and cultural
cache grew formidably.
“The Taking Economy” is representative of a wider shift in thought that occurred over
the latter half of the 2010’s in which scholarly interest in the Gig Economy’s rhetorical and
theoretical roots was supplanted by analyses of how this rhetoric was being applied in practice
and how these applications affected gig workers. While Calo and Rosenblat primarily focus their
piece on gig economy rhetoric, they also point to the ways in which the decentralized systems of
worker administration informed by this rhetoric impact gig workers both positively and
negatively (Calo and Rosenblat 2017, 1641-1647). Many of these impacts have to do with the
perceived agency that gig workers enjoy while on the job and the role that algorithmic
management systems play in the maintenance of this agency or the perpetuation of illusory
agency. Cathy O’Neil’s Weapons of Math Destruction f urther calls this traditionally-accepted
notion of algorithmic neutrality into question through a mixture of case studies, theoretical
analysis and O’Neil’s own experiences as a mathematician and data scientist. Drawing on her
own professional experience designing and analyzing mathematical models, one type of which
are algorithms, O’Neil warns that such models “reflect goals and ideology” of those who create
them, equating them to “opinions embedded in mathematics” (O’Neil 2016, 21). This framing is
important as it resituates responsibility for these models’ output, both positive and negative, onto
their designers and the entities that hire and direct them. Algorithms that govern labor systems,
O’Neil posits, are “optimized for efficiency and profitability, not for justice or the good of the
team,” making their objectives no more altruistic than profit seeking enterprises run directly by
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human executives (O’Neil 2016, 129-130). While the algorithms that dictate work in the Gig
Economy may be driven by familiarly self-serving objectives and motives, the
worker-corporation relationship that they’ve created is novel and only partially understood.
One such inquiry into gig workers’ reactions to and considerations of their work being
administered by an algorithm is “Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and
Data-Driven Management on Human Workers,” a study of Uber drivers conducted in 2015. This
study, conducted by a team of researchers led by Min Kyung Lee, aimed to shed light on
foundational questions regarding the nature of algorithmically administered work, namely how
workers cooperate with algorithmically-assigned work, how algorithmic optimization motivates
workers (if at all), and how data-driven worker evaluation systems are perceived (Lee 2015, 1).
While this study’s findings on driver opinions were less than conclusive - surveyed drivers held
moderately positive opinions on dispatch algorithms, were largely indifferent to surge pricing
and held moderately negative opinions on driver rating systems - the researchers’ justifications
for these findings illuminate the psychological impact of gig work on a much wider scale. Based
upon their findings, Lee et al. “believe the organizational context of being independent
contractors played an important role: the flexibility and choices that the ridesharing drivers have
in work compensate for the lack of control in assignment algorithms” (Lee 2015, 8). This belief
points to the potential of a self-perpetuating reality of gig work in which drivers’ expectations of
workplace autonomy are tempered by their independent contractor status, which in turn makes
their independent contractor status more palatable and seem more logical. Though this is
important research done on what at that time had been an under-studied and notoriously difficult
to survey group of workers, many of its findings are either marginally relevant or wholly
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obsolete in 2020, as many of the work structures it inquires about are either markedly different or
have been completely replaced. Gig economy companies are known to alter their business
practices and policies very frequently and often with little warning, making studying or
regulating these practices in the long term uncommonly difficult.
Naturally, as Uber and the rest of the Gig Economy became increasingly prominent, the
body of qualitative research conducted on its participants grew accordingly. No example of this
research is as expansive or pointed in its criticism of these structures as Alex Rosenblat’s
Uberland, which combines ethnographic research with critical analysis in a manner that exposes
the Gig Economy’s massive potential for worker exploitation and manipulation. Rosenblat’s
analysis is based upon a similar premise to Lee et al. 's - the impact of algorithmic administration
on workers - but her research points to a considerably more sinister and exploitative reality than
many earlier analyses. Rosenblat points to algorithmic management as the primary means by
which Uber is able to create and maintain an information discrepancy between its corporate
entity and its drivers large enough to enjoy significant control over its drivers’ workflow without
the levers of such control becoming obvious or obtrusive (Rosenblat 2018, 92). While she notes
that these levers of control - no matter how opaque they may be - are of varying importance to
drivers who rely on income from driving to different degrees, she maintains that such systems
can easily become unsustainable and exploitative if left unchecked and unregulated (Rosenblat
2018, 50). It is this system of algorithmic management that, Rosenblat posits, allows Uber to
continue to market itself as an entrepreneurial opportunity for its drivers, a position that has
figured prominently in the company’s public persona from its onset (Rosenblat 2018, 85).
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b. Corporate Identity
The sort of identity creation and storytelling that Rosenblat points to - Uber’s positioning
of itself as an engine of economic opportunity through entrepreneurialism - is a prime example
of a concept known as corporate identity. As corporations have become increasingly politically
empowered, advertising and marketing technologies have become incredibly sophisticated, and
the general public has become increasingly conscious of its consumption habits, corporations
have become increasingly inclined to project favorable images of their practices, their leaders,
and their impact on society at large. This newfound autonomy in terms of narrative setting has
become a major source of corporate power in recent decades, but there remains considerable
disagreement on the ultimate beneficence of this trend. In analyzing the net societal impact of
corporate identity, it is important to first explore the contours of corporate identity as it is defined
by thought leaders within the world of business marketing. In doing so, one stands to gain insight
into the characteristics that are believed to constitute an effective corporate identity, the
perceived functions that corporate identity serves, and the institutional values it is supposed to
represent or uphold.
The concept of corporate identity is loosely defined by Cees B.M van Reil and John M.T.
Balmer in their piece titled “Corporate Identity: the Concept, Its Measurement and Management”
as corporations’ attempts at fostering favorable public opinions of themselves through symbolic
and visual cues, formal corporate communication (both internal and external), and overall
organizational behavior patterns (Balmer and van Riel 1997, 341). Symbolic and visual cues
refer to the color schemes, logos, typefaces and other design elements that corporations include
in their advertising and other public-facing endeavors. Similarly, formal corporate
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communication entails the actual written content of corporations’ advertising and other
public-facing endeavors as well as statements made by executives or legal counsel on behalf of a
corporation. Behavioral patterns delve somewhat beyond the surface and entail a corporation’s
partnerships, business and labor practices, organizational structure and relationship with
governing or regulatory bodies.
Despite the widely inclusive nature of their definition, however, van Riel and Balmer
note that many scholars believe that corporate identity is a concept that is too dynamic and
multidisciplinary to be formally defined (International Corporate Identity Group 2019). This
belief is outlined in the “Strathclyde Statement”, an official position taken by the International
Corporate Identity Group (ICIG) in which corporate identity’s various aspects are explained but
the term as a whole is not formally defined (International Corporate Identity Group 2019). This
statement’s primary function is to differentiate corporate identity from what the ICIG calls
traditional “brand marketing,” which is only concerned with engaging consumers while
corporate identity aims to engage a wide variety of actors including potential investors,
regulators and the corporation’s own employees. The multifaceted nature of Balmer and van
Riel’s definition as well as the Strathclyde Statement’s aforementioned implications point to the
variety of audiences and stakeholders that corporations’ self-crafted identities are intended to
persuade.
Though these pieces do well to provide insight into the values and goals that drive
business leaders’ attempts at fostering favorable corporate identities, they do not address the
underlying phenomena of human actors ascribing human characteristics to the inherently
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inhuman, socially-constructed entity that is the corporation itself. Expanding on this viewpoint is
Richard Hardack’s “New and Improved: The Zero-Sum Game of Corporate Personhood,” which
ultimately makes the argument that corporations take on the characteristics of the individuals
who establish them through the managerial and advertising decisions those individuals make,
which are based upon the economic, cultural and social circumstances of the time (Hardack
2014, 36). Ascribing human features onto an inorganic entity like a corporation is, according to
Hardack, only possible due to corporations’ legal status and the rights that this status explicitly
affords their proprietors (Hardack 2014, 37). Hardack extrapolates his argument that since
corporations are inorganic entities, their corporate speech should be legally regarded as
commercial speech and by definition cannot be considered political speech, thus making it
subject to regulation under the commerce clause of the constitution (Hardack 2014, 38-39).
Hardack’s argument seems to center executive level decision-making as the factor most
intrinsically linked to the features of a corporation’s identity. Though their thinking will almost
always be dictated by market trends, technological innovation and consumer preference to at
least some degree, these factors are similarly subject to the interpretation of individuals replete
with their own biases, beliefs and egos. In the case of Uber and its ascendant path, the biases,
beliefs and egos that mattered most were those of its two co-founders Travis Kalanick and
Garrett Camp. Though complimentary in their respective areas of expertise, with Camp as the
technical expert and Kalanick the corporate strategist, their respective visions for their
company’s future were often times at odds, with Camp envisioning Uber remaining an exclusive
black car service and Kalanick (along with some of the company’s earliest and most influential
investors) preferring a peer-to-peer model avoiding the numerous regulations inherent in
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traditional livery transportation (Isaac 2019, 49-50; Stone 2017, 120-121). These two visions are
laid out in two recent books - Brad Stone’s The Upstarts and Mike Isaac’s Super Pumped -  that
recount the company’s inception and the shared set of beliefs that inspired it (Isaac 2019, 49-50;
Stone 2017, 44-45).

c. Uber’s Corporate Leadership
Super Pumped (2019) primarily focuses on how Kalanick fashioned Uber in his own
image and according to his own personally held-ideals during his tenure as the company’s CEO.
The book’s prologue provides a detailed account of the manner in which he preferred to launch
Uber’s services in a new city: without the consent and often against the wishes of local
lawmakers or interest groups (Isaac 2019, xiii-xiv). This preference stemmed from Kalanick’s
“belief that politicians, when it came down to it, would always act the same way: they would
protect the established order” (Isaac 2019, xv). This belief, coupled with his deeply held notion
that Uber was “transformational” and would produce positive societal outcomes if allowed to
operate as originally intended, prompted Kalanick’s decision to operate his company outside the
confines of legality.
The long-term impacts of this hyper-aggressive and law-flouting environment established
and incentivized by Uber’s top executives is chronicled in Benjamin Edelman’s piece in the
Harvard Business Review t itled “Uber Can’t be Fixed...It’s Time for Regulators to Shut it
Down” (Edelman 2017). In this piece, Edelman attributes this growth-inducing but unsustainable
internal identity to Kalanick’s leadership style. In making the initial decision to operate outside
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the confines of local transportation laws in the interest of maximizing growth, Kalanick instilled
in his employees the incentive to follow his example to the extent that this became a core aspect
of the company’s internal identity and source of pride amongst employees. Uber employees’
eagerness to follow Kalanick’s reckless example is explained in Super Pumped as having two
primary sources: Kalanick’s own seemingly boundless energy and passion for the company’s
product and Silicon Valley’s culture of “founder worship,” which venerated successful
entrepreneurship as the pinnacle of human accomplishment and virtue (Isaac 2019, 74-75, 84).
By the time Kalanick was forced to exit the company amidst myriad instances of personal and
professional misconduct, this ethos had become so thoroughly baked into Uber’s business model
that Edelman felt inclined to openly call for cities whose laws Uber has violated to essentially
fine the company into bankruptcy (Edelman 2017).
Despite the clear transgressions that Edelman’s article lays out, Uber remains a hugely
influential archetype within the startup milieu, as it is inspiring new waves of technology-based
businesses to tread similarly dicey paths. The spread of this reckless, all-or-nothing approach to
revenue growth is chronicled in Jordan M. Berry and Elizabeth Pollman’s article “Regulatory
Entrepreneurship.” In this piece, Pollman and Berry position Uber and Lyfts’ approach to
dealing with regulation within a wider category of corporate behavior that they call “regulatory
entrepreneurship,” which they define as “pursuing a line of business in which changing the law is
a significant part of the business plan” (Berry and Pollman 2017, 383). In their diagnosis of how
companies that operate in such murky legal waters - the likes of AirBNB, DraftKings, and Tesla
in addition to TNCs - have been able to not only maintain operations but thrive, Pollman and
Berry point to a handful of common characteristics, namely that they are “well-funded, scalable,
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and highly connected startup businesses with mass appeal” (Berry and Pollman 2017, 383).
These characteristics point to the central importance of fostering positive corporate identities
with a wide range of societal stakeholders in companies’ ability to maintain such business
models and fight off regulation. The descriptors “well-funded, scalable, highly connected...with
mass appeal” allude to the roles that the various audiences that will be included in the theoretical
analysis portion of this research - customers, regulators, and workers - play in the creation and
preservation of Uber’s corporate identity and thus its ability to avoid regulation of its labor
practices.
Of all the aforementioned stakeholders and the various important roles that their
complicity plays in the preservation of Uber’s corporate identity, investors seem to be among the
most overlooked. Though their overall economic and cultural relevance is readily apparent,
venture capitalists’ influence over the risky and at times illegal behavior of the companies they
fund is often left under-examined. The unequal stakes that characterize the investor-corporation
relationship are clearly identified and explained in Douglas Rushkoff’s Throwing Rocks at the
Google Bus, i n which the author explains that while venture capital firms fund dozens if not
hundreds of companies at a time, they expect the vast majority of these companies to fail and
thus impose extremely high growth requirements on their investees to ensure that the few that do
succeed will supply them with an exponential return on their investment (Rushkoff 2016, 189).
Isaac similarly explains this mode of operation in Super Pumped when he notes that “for venture
capitalists and founders alike, the goal is to guide the company to either B or C rounds [of
funding] or ‘liquidity events.’ Those are when a VC can finally convert shares in a company into
cash” (Isaac 2019, 73). While this may be a financially prudent investing strategy on the venture
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capitalist’s part, it is these very unnaturally high growth requirements that incentivize and, in
many cases, necessitate the implementation of potentially nefarious and illegal practices by the
companies these firms are investing in.
Venture Capital firms may control the purse strings, but the power relationships that exist
between them and tech company founders are considerably more complex than this fact alone
might allude to. As Isaac notes in Super Pumped, t he tech industry’s maturation into a major
global economic force endowed successful tech entrepreneurs with not only visionary, almost
mythical status, but an increasing ability to maintain operational and strategic control over their
companies throughout the process of receiving funding as well (Isaac 2019, 75-76). Inspired by
Google co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin, Kalanick sought to maintain as much
operational and strategic control over his company as possible. According to Isaac, this meant
securing investment while ceding as few ownership shares, board seats, and as little voting
power as possible, even going as far as adopting a two-tiered system of ownership share
allocation called a “dual class stock structure” which affords additional voting power to shares
held by Kalanick as opposed to those held by investors (Isaac 2019, 76, 97). Though Kalanick
was successful in his bid to retain as much decision-making power for himself as possible
throughout the fundraising process, he guided the company in a way that largely adhered to the
same ideals and goal structure held by most venture capitalists - the pursuit of maximum revenue
growth and market share attainment. It is difficult to tell what exactly Kalanick’s reasoning for
this pursuit was. Though the grandiosity with which he was inclined to speak about Uber’s
ultimate potential would point to a deep-seated belief in the transformational power of his
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company’s product, this unrelenting pursuit of growth was likely also intended to ensure the
company’s continued access to venture capital funding.
Regardless of the source of the growth-driven ethos Kalanick adopted, its dictation of
Uber’s labor practices and by extension the working conditions of drivers is abundantly clear. In
documents filed with regulatory bodies, Uber’s management has explicitly stated that in order to
accomplish their aforementioned goals, maintaining drivers’ status as independent contractors
and thus minimizing labor costs is of primary importance (S-1 2019, 28). However, what Uber’s
executives have traditionally been opaque about, and what researchers have taken a keen interest
in, are the wider implications that this work configuration may have for workers themselves and
on society as a whole. Within this body of research, two main themes of inquiry have emerged:
the impact of flexible and precarious work arrangements on workers’ economic outcomes and
personal well-being and the difficulties of effectively regulating these sorts of arrangements.

d. Precarious Work in the United States
One study that undertakes an exhaustive, long-term historical analysis of labor precarity
in the United States is Arne Kalleberg’s “Precarious Work, Insecure Workers,” which was
published at the height of the Great Recession in 2009. Kalleberg’s research covers three primary
topics: evidence of precarious work’s rise since the 1970’s, the consequences of this rise on a
societal level, and a plea for his fellow sociologists to turn their attention to labor precarity in
hopes of compounding on society’s understanding of its social, rather than simply its economic,
impacts (Kalleberg 2009, 2-11). While Kalleberg’s discussion of topics like the gradual shifting
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of risk from employer to employee and the growth of perceived job insecurity among workers
provides necessary context through which one can analyze Uber’s role in this phenomenon, as
are his musings on precarity’s role in exacerbating wealth inequality, perhaps the most lasting
contribution of this work is its clear enunciation of labor precarity’s public policy implications
(Kalleberg 2009, 7-8).
Fully recognizing the hegemony of contemporary free market globalization, Kalleberg
points to the need for public policy solutions that “seek to help people deal with the uncertainty
and unpredictability of their work— and their resulting confusion and increasingly chaotic and
insecure lives—while still preserving some of the flexibility that employers need to compete in a
global marketplace” (Kalleberg 2009, 16). Ultimately, Kalleberg points to revitalized social
protections “to alleviate the disruptions caused by the operation of unfettered markets” and
policies to create non-precarious jobs as the two primary strategies for combating precarity
(Kalleberg 2009, 16). Kalleberg’s diagnosis of the problem and policy proposals, broad as they
may be, provide important context that situates the Gig Economy’s rise within a larger social
phenomenon and, using insights from this decades long shift toward precarity, clearly lays out
the stakes involved in this shift.
Subsequent efforts to analyze this vexing phenomenon have adopted a more granular
approach, at times even proposing alternative ways of measuring precarity. Wayne Lewchuk
attempts just this in his 2017 piece “Precarious Jobs: where are they, and how do they affect
well-being?” Lewchuk begins his inquiry by citing the inadequacies of traditional labor market
data, namely their inability to track rises in temporary and casual employment. This argument
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dovetails with Kalleberg’s piece nicely, as it justifies Kalleberg’s reliance on tangentially related
phenomenon like rises in perceived job insecurity and decrease in average tenure length in his
analysis of precarity (Lewchuk 2017, 402; Kalleberg 2009, 6-7). In an attempt to compensate for
these inadequacies, which he believes chronically under-represent employment precarity,
Lewchuk proposes a new measurement that he calls the Economic Precarity Index, or EPI, which
he describes as being designed “to explore the security characteristics of different forms of the
employment relationship...offering a tool to measure employment security… and assess how
insecure employment associated with a ‘gig’ economy might affect well-being and social
relations, including health outcomes, household well-being and community involvement”
(Lewchuk 2017, 403). To accomplish this, Lewchuk breaks down precarity into ten indicative
components which can be used to survey workers, including schedule consistency, week-to-week
income variance, employer-provided benefits and prevalence of cash-based income, among
others (Lewchuk 2017, 410). Despite this and other commendable efforts to break down this
multifaceted and nuanced phenomenon into easily digestible figures, precarity remains a concept
rife with inherent subjectivity, making its precise quantification very unlikely.
Unsurprisingly, precarity’s unwieldy nature as a topic of study has significantly
complicated efforts to combat it through legislative means. These difficulties have prompted
scholars to seek alternative lenses through which to view and characterize precarity, at times in
hopes of convincing employers themselves to more actively address the precarity of their own
workforces, and critiquing customary regulatory frameworks at others. A prime example of a
piece that attempts the former is “Uber Drivers and Employment Status in the Gig Economy,”
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which aims to convince Uber and other Gig Economy companies to alter their employment
tactics by appealing to a concept called “corporate social responsibility” (Malos et al. 2018, 239).
According to the study’s authors, “corporate social responsibility” is a tactic used by
corporations to address the social implications of their business, namely the economic, physical
and mental well-being of their employees, through actions beyond regulatory compliance”
(Malos et al. 2018, 239). By definition, since it goes beyond mandated worker benefits and
protections, corporate social responsibility “maintains that companies should perform in a
manner consistent with expectations of societal mores, recognize evolving ethical/moral norms
adopted by society, prevent those norms from being compromised in order to achieve business
goals, and recognize that ethical behavior goes beyond mere compliance with laws and
regulations” (Malos et al. 2018, 247). Under this definition and its implications, the authors
argue that Uber and other Gig Economy companies “have a responsibility to their workers to
help them maintain a living wage and decent levels of social welfare” which, in their estimate,
includes reclassifying drivers as employees (Malos et al. 2018, 247). Clearly, this argument
hinges on grand assumptions made regarding the existence of uniform social mores across
society, the nature of corporate behavior as something separate from that of corporate executives
and the congruence between business goals and positive social outcomes, all of which seem to
oversimplify labor precarity in its contemporary manifestation.
Such assumptions become increasingly dubious when one considers the unique nature of
gig economy companies in relation to traditional corporations and firms, a topic that Julia
Tomassetti dedicates considerable attention to in “Does Uber Redefine the Firm? The
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Postindustrial Corporation and Advanced Information Technology.” Essentially, Tomassetti
alleges that difficulties faced in attempts to regulate the Gig Economy stem from social
scientists' and regulators’ antiquated conception of what principles contemporary corporations
operate under. She posits that, rather than the “industrial model” favored by regulators and social
scientists, companies in the gig economy should be considered “post-industrial corporations,”
which she defines as a corporation that “still seeks to maximize profits, but not necessarily
through productive enterprise. It may pursue shareholder value through asset manipulation,
speculative activity, and regulatory arbitrage and evasion” (Tomassetti 2016, 5). Tomassetti’s
primary argument, however, addresses Uber’s claim that it’s business transcends all conceptions
of the firm and acts as a digital market intermediary between independent transportation
businesses and consumers. Drawing from Coasian Firm Theory, Tomassetti rebukes this
convenient self-perpetuated rhetoric and claims that Uber is indeed a “post-industrial
corporation” whose “technology (as well as its power) appears to have lowered the costs of firm
coordination relative to market coordination by reducing agency costs and enabling Uber to
direct production inputs without assuming the costs of formal property rights” (Tomassetti 2016,
7). In this diagnosis, Tomassetti directly links Uber’s misclassification of drivers, a major source
of the company’s cost mitigation, to regulatory arbitrage, which is a core tenet of post-industrial
corporate identity.
From Tomassetti’s analysis, it may be natural to conclude that pursuing the
reclassification of gig workers’ employment status, whether it be via legislation or litigation, is
the best way to mitigate the social ills being produced by the Gig Economy’s labor practices.
Despite the argument that worker reclassification would theoretically eliminate a majority of the
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precarity associated with gig work, the actual track record of pursuing reclassification through
litigation has been rather mixed, as is outlined in Veena Dubal’s “Winning the Battle, Losing the
War? Assessing the Impact of Misclassification Litigation on Workers in the Gig Economy.”
Dubal’s analysis is based upon three case studies of successful class action worker
misclassification lawsuits. In each of these case studies, Dubal finds that despite a favorable
outcome in the courtroom, the reclassified workers’ overall situations did not necessarily
improve and in some cases became even more precarious (Dubal 2017, 740). While she
acknowledges the role that reclassification litigation plays as a deterrent by drawing public
attention to misclassification and dissuading firms form embracing the independent contractor
model, Dubal’s finds the efficacy of such litigation detrimentally limited by the structural power
imbalance that exists between employers and their workers (Dubal 2017, 746-747). While two of
the defendant corporations threatened their employees with blacklists and replacement workers if
they attempted to follow through with reclassification, the third modified its entire business
model to make its drivers seem less like employees (Dubal 2017, 747). This sort of post-facto
maneuvering on the part of corporations is proof, Dubal claims, that “misclassification litigation
must be leveraged alongside other forms of political and legal activism that are attendant to
worker self-visions and that build and nurture collective worker power” (Dubal 2017, 748).
Navigating the vast power discrepancies that exist between gig economy companies and
their independently contracted workers necessitates, as Dubal argues, a multifaceted analytical
approach. To this end, there has been a great deal of research dedicated to many aspects of this
phenomenon, including many of the pieces included in this literature review. The works of Isaac,
Rushkoff and Stone illuminate the role that influential individual actors, namely corporate
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executives and investors, play in both the creation and justification of these power discrepancies.
The underlying ethos that informs these actors’ rhetorical and business strategies is outlined by
Morozov, Castells and Turner. The theoretical appeal of such strategies, which include labor
force decentralization and co-optation of communalist ideals for corporate ends, is chronicled in
the works of Benkler, Schor and Fitzmaurice, and Rosenblat and Calo, which are in direct
conversation with O'Neil, Lee and Rosenblat’s analyses of algorithmic management’s impacts on
workers. These respective topics point toward a thorny reality for regulators and gig workers
alike, a reality which Dubal, Malos and Lewchuk analyze the contours of in hopes of fostering
truly impactful policy change.
What the existing literature does not explicitly cover, however, is the ways by which gig
economy companies have been able to leverage their corporate identities, largely through their
formal corporate communications with regulators and consumers, in their opposition to attempts
at regulating their labor practices. Such an inquiry combines elements of all the aforementioned
areas of analysis, namely how these companies fuse their technological capacity and
decentralized business models with the wider silicon valley techno-positivist ethos to create
corporate identities and implement patterns of corporate communication that inform their
opposition to regulation of their labor practices. The forthcoming research intends to add to this
robust and rapidly growing body of literature by addressing this very question through a case
study of Uber’s corporate identity and communications. Uber’s driver, rider and regulator-facing
communications are of particular importance in this analysis, as they are the primary vehicles
through which widespread public consent regarding their labor practices is manufactured. To be
sure, gauging the full extent of Uber’s corporate identity and its impact on regulatory attempts
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would include analyses of its legal defenses in employment misclassification and wage theft
lawsuits as well as the company’s lobbying efforts, two avenues of inquiry that my research does
not discuss at length but aims to complement. The ultimate goal of this research is to provide
insight that will contextualize Uber’s corporate communication strategies in hopes of fostering a
more critical and nuanced understanding of the systems that the company has gone to such
extreme lengths to mystify.

4. Methods
The previous portion of this research demonstrated the importance of investigating how
Uber’s corporate identity has informed its attempts at avoiding the regulation of its labor
practices. In this section, I will explain the methods by which I attempted to answer my research
question, which include theoretical analysis of a selection of the company’s official
communications and a survey of drivers who received messaging from Uber regarding AB5. I
chose these methods because of their ability to provide insight into the underlying assumptions
of Uber’s anti-regulatory messaging, what the messaging reveals about Uber’s desired external
and internal identities and, ultimately, the efficacy of this messaging.
The vast majority of my findings regarding Uber’s corporate identity and its influence on
the company’s campaign against AB5 were generated through a theoretical analysis of a
selection of the company’s official communications. These communications span roughly the
same length of time as the company’s ongoing campaign against AB5, which began shortly after
the California Supreme Court’s May 2018 ruling in Dynamex Operations West Inc. v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles. According to the California Employment Development Department, the

52
“ABC” test that Dynamex e stablished and AB5 codified into California law requires employers
to classify workers who do not fulfill all of the following criteria as employees rather than
independent contractors.
A: The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the
performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact.
B:The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business
C:The person is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business of the same nature as that involved in the work performed.

A significant amount of the information I based my findings on came from Uber’s
various city and state-specific blogs. I visited four such blogs in an effort to locate the company’s
announcements of the various products it debuted and companies it acquired during the period of
time leading up to its initial public offering in May 2019 through January 2020. From these blog
posts, I analyzed the company’s rhetoric regarding these expansions while assessing its attempts
at diversifying its business model. To find the company’s messaging on its acquisition of the
e-scooter and e-bike company Jump, the debut of Uber Money as well as the announcement of a
$1 billion investment in its Autonomous Vehicle Group, I searched the company’s most general
blog, which is called “Uber Newsroom.” The company’s post regarding the launch of Uber
Copter was posted in its New York City-specific blog, while its California blog hosted the two
posts regarding the slate of changes in terms of driver administration announced in the
immediate aftermath of AB5. Finally, the announcement of a feature available in certain cities
that allows users to “see nearby public transit stops and real-time departure information” is
located in it’s US-wide blog.
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In addition to Uber’s official blog posts, I examined its Initial Public Offering Prospectus,
a document filed with the US Securities and Exchange Commission in preparation for the
company’s initial public offering in May 2019. IPO Prospectuses are meant to be comprehensive
accounts of the filing company’s history, assets, business plan, growth projections and potential
risk factors that serve as a reference for potential investors and regulators alike. Due to its
expansive and official nature, Uber’s IPO prospectus provides perhaps the purest distillation of
what the company’s executives consider its relations with its drivers to be, as well as their
assessment of the risks posed by labor legislation that would reclassify the company’s drivers as
employees. My analysis of this document focused on areas wherein the company discussed the
role that it believes drivers play in the company’s overall structure, with a particular emphasis on
the financial risk that driver-reclassifying legislation like AB5 poses as well as the company’s
attempt at minimizing drivers’ centrality to its business model and growth projections.
While the company’s IPO Prospectus represents a relatively sober and unvarnished
account of its relationship with its drivers, two types of its public-facing communications
produced in the immediate wake of AB5’s passage depict a more curated version of this reality.
The first of these communications is a conference call set up by the company’s chief counsel
Tony West and its California public policy director Davis Webb to debrief local and national
journalists on the company’s initial response to the law’s passage while providing a general
outline of the company’s planned response to California’s shifting regulatory environment.
Roughly three months after AB5’s passage, Uber joined a group of its fellow TNCs in
sponsoring a piece of legislation that aims to solidify their workers’ classification as independent
contractors called the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act.” My analysis of this act,

54
however, centered on the messaging of the promotional campaign surrounding it rather than the
Act itself. This decision was born of the notion that the messages by which Uber attempts to
court support for this act are more representative of its desired public-facing corporate identity
than the bill’s actual text. In particular, I focused my analysis on a collection of 71 “driver
stories,” or testimonials from California-based drivers regarding their preference to remain
independent contractors rather than employees. In order to uncover any recurring themes in these
testimonials that may indicate a specific narrative being promoted by Uber, I read (and watched,
as some of the testimonials were in video form) all 71 testimonials while categorizing them
based on their thematic content. Specifically, I tallied the economic, social and personal reasons
why each of the featured drivers preferred independent contractor status, drivers’ perceptions
about their relationship to their work with Uber, and what aspect of driving they seemed to value
the most.
To serve as a control group for this experiment, I conducted a similar analysis on a
selection of 62 “driver stories” videos found on Uber’s official YouTube page. These videos,
which were released between 2014 and 2019 and have amassed over 9.3 million views, span
multiple campaigns, issue areas and locations, thus providing a less case-specific depiction of
Uber’s corporate identity. The considerable breadth in content included in this set of videos
provides a representative baseline from which to analyze Uber’s desired corporate identity in
regards to its relationship with its drivers. Upon conducting this analysis, I tallied the number of
videos with common themes from Uber’s YouTube page and the “Protect App Based Drivers
and Services” website and compared the dominant themes of each set. Through this comparison,
I was able to detect significant variations between Uber’s messaging in the context of a political
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campaign and in the various other contexts that were exemplified in its YouTube “driver
stories.”
In order to gain additional insight into my analysis, the order in which I observed these
two series must be noted as well. I watched all 62 of the YouTube “driver stories” first, with
virtually no prior knowledge of their thematic content other than what I could gather from the
titles and thumbnail images. This decision was based in large part due to my intention of having
the YouTube “driver stories” act as a control group for the “Protect App Based Drivers and
Services” testimonials. By watching all 62 YouTube “driver stories” before exposing myself to
any aspect of the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” website, I was able to engage with
the content of the YouTube videos with minimal bias and temptation to search for narratives
where they might not truly exist.
The fact that both the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials and Uber’s
YouTube page are both funded and operated by Uber itself makes these sources more reliable
indicators of the company’s desired narrative of its labor relations than of actual driver sentiment
toward the company. In order to more accurately gauge drivers’ unvarnished opinions regarding
AB5 as well as Uber’s attempts at influencing drivers’ opinions on the issue of their employment
classification, I created and disseminated an online survey using Google Forms, a web-based
survey creation application. The survey primarily focused on drivers’ responses to Uber’s tactic
of sending messages directly to drivers regarding their classification and “maintaining
flexibility” during the summer of 2019. The survey was divided into five sections: demographic
information, information on the frequency, content and format of messages drivers received from
Uber, drivers’ thoughts on the appropriateness of employers sending political messaging to their
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workers and drivers’ opinions on AB5 specifically. In order to maintain anonymity, respondents
were not asked for any information that would identify themselves and all questions asking for
demographic information were optional. A complete list of the questions included in the survey
can be found in Appendix A. Featuring a mixture of multiple choice, free response and five-point
sliding scale question formats, the survey takes roughly ten minutes to complete if none of the
optional questions are skipped.
My strategy for disseminating the survey included outreach to drivers through online
driver forums and social media pages. Getting the link to my survey posted onto such sites,
however, was a multi-step process. For security and moderation concerns, many of the online
driver forums I encountered were closed non-drivers and had application processes for
prospective members. Being a non-driver myself, I explained my situation and intentions to the
administrators of each group before formally requesting entrance. Thankfully, I received warm
and welcoming responses from virtually all group administrators and members alike. I was
ultimately granted entry into seven driver Facebook groups - all of which set up for
California-based drivers specifically - with a total of 51,034 members between them as well as
the California-specific forum on the popular driver site “UberPeople.Net,” which does not
disclose the number of active members on a given forum. While the survey was live, from
January 23, 2020 until March 1, 2020, I posted a standardized message to each of the
aforementioned groups either three or four times, so as to not inundate the groups with my
messaging. The three groups that I was granted access to after my survey went live were those
that I sent three rather than four messages to. In addition to this method of outreach, I also
contacted Harry Campbell, known more commonly as “the Rideshare Guy,” for assistance with
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disseminating my survey. Campbell, who is one of the most prominent, respected and prolific
rideshare industry experts in the US, agreed to include a link to my survey in his driver
newsletter that has an audience of over 60,000 people.
As a result of this multifaceted outreach effort, my survey received 40 responses during
the five week dissemination period. This number is significantly lower than what would be
necessary to produce statistically significant results or represent an accurate cross section of all
drivers in California. However, I contend that conducting a survey in this manner was the most
effective plausible outreach strategy given the financial, time, and capacity constraints I faced
throughout the research process. Although conducting interviews would have allowed me to
attain more detailed insight into individual drivers’ experiences and opinions regarding AB5, it
would have been extremely difficult if not impossible to reach the same number of drivers
through this method as I was able to with a survey. The value judgement to prioritize the number
of responses over the ultimate quality and length of individual responses was not an easy one to
reach, but I maintain that it produced the most useful results possible given my own capacity and
circumstances.
At the point in time that I initially disseminated the driver survey, I intended on
researching both Uber and Lyfts’ anti-regulatory campaigns through the lens of their corporate
identities. Due to the fact that I did not decide to decrease the scope of my research until after the
initial publication of the survey, a portion of its respondents drive for Lyft in addition to or
instead of Uber, and my initial round of outreach was toward online driver forums for both
companies’ drivers. In the interest of time, I was inclined to continue conducting the survey with
both Uber and Lyft drivers as respondents rather than re-formatting and distributing the survey a
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second time solely for Uber drivers. While Uber and Lyft indeed harbor myriad differences in
terms of corporate identity and public persona, their business models and systems of labor
administration are markedly similar, as is evidenced by the fact that almost all online driver
forums that I encountered during the survey process included drivers for both companies who
seemingly shared stories, advice and questions across company lines with relative ease.
In many regards, the histories, business practices and corporate identities of Uber and
Lyft, its primary competitor in the TNC space, are inseperable. The two companies were
launched around the same time and thrived in the same economic environment while attempting
to solve the same problem using similar technologies and business models. This research was
initially intended to analyze the corporate identities of both companies, but due to an array of
considerations discussed below, I have decided to proceed with an analysis of Uber’s corporate
identity only. The primary reason for this decision is the two companies’ considerable
similarities that range from their labor practices to their marketing campaigns. Most important
among these similarities, however, is their unflinching and often collaborative resistance toward
any meaningful regulation of their labor practices. Not only are the two companies’ interests
united due to their ostensibly identical business models, they have actively joined forces in a
number of anti-regulation campaigns, most notably the “Protect App Based Drivers and
Services” campaign in opposition to AB5. Analyzing these practices separately for each
company would likely lead to many redundant findings and analysis that would not necessarily
serve to propel the conversation forward in a way that an analysis of Uber alone could not.
Despite these myriad similarities, there is one factor that sets Uber apart from not only
Lyft but the rest of its competitors as well: the level of scrutiny it receives from the media and
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populace as a whole. Much of this negative attention has been self-inflicted due to the brazenness
of co-founder and ex-CEO Travis Kalanick and the hostile, misogynist culture he cultivated at
the company. However, it has also had the effect of deflecting a great deal of largely-deserved
scrutiny away from Lyft despite the two companies ostensibly identical labor practices and
business models. Perhaps due to the enhanced visibility that Uber has garnered due to its
notoriously unsavory founder and internal culture, the vast majority of researchers, journalists
and academics who study TNCs and their impact on workers focus their inquiries on Uber
specifically. It has become increasingly apparent throughout this research process that, for better
or worse, the most vibrant and prescient conversations taking place about this industry are
focusing exclusively on Uber. In hopes of making a contribution to this discourse, I’ve decided
to follow this path.
To be sure, the issue of time also plays a role in my decision to shift my focus away from
Lyft and toward Uber. Given the constrained timeline on which I conducted this research, I
believe that limiting my inquiry to one company allowed me to conduct a more nuanced and
profound analysis of that company as opposed to hasty or incomplete analyses of two very
similar companies.

5. Findings and Analysis
a. Conflating Efficiency-Seeking with Progressivism
The foundation of Uber’s corporate identity - which has animated the company’s
attempts at avoiding regulation from its early days dodging local transportation officials in San
Francisco to its high profile, multi-million dollar campaigns against state level labor legislation -
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is its self-identification as a tech company rather than as a taxi company. This crucial distinction
has not only established the underlying logic for the company’s legal and rhetorical arguments
against the reclassification of its drivers, it communicates specific and advantageous messages
about the company’s overall ethos as well. Particularly, this tactic positions Uber’s operations
and ethos as progressive and innovation-oriented. Such a depiction is rooted in long-standing,
widely accepted characterizations of Silicon Valley’s most prominent tech firms as ceaselessly
utilizing cutting edge technology to upend, or “disrupt,” traditional power structures and
institutional arrangements in pursuit of maximizing systemic efficiency. While profit incentive
undoubtedly lies at the core of all corporate decision-making across time, location and industry,
tech companies like Uber have popularized staggeringly effective rhetorical strategies to blunt
the unsavory nature of their goals. Such strategies, which Uber’s adoption of will be discussed at
length in this section, focus on the non-economic benefits of prioritizing efficiency and
disrupting existing systems, often by framing such systems as corrupt (or corruptible),
unresponsive, and undemocratic.
Uber’s corporate rhetoric aims to establish a stark contrast between itself and the taxi
industry it has largely replaced. By aligning itself with vague but widely agreeable ideals like
progress and modernity, Uber not only paints the taxi industry as diametrically opposed to such
ideals but attributes a non-economic character to the company’s practices. This contrast was
expressed often during Uber’s initial rise to prominence, oftentimes by the company’s
co-founder and CEO Travis Kalanick. A particularly telling and widely-circulated example of
such a declaration is Kalanick’s likening his company’s mission to a political campaign in which
“the candidate is Uber and the opponent is an assh*** named Taxi. Nobody likes him, he’s not a
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nice character, but he’s so woven into the political machinery and fabric that a lot of people owe
him favors” (Isaac 2019, 81-82). He would go on to liken taxi companies to “cartels” in
subsequent rants, never leaving his disdain for the industry up to question (Isaac 2019, 114). For
a time, Kalanick’s sentiments were widely accepted and echoed in the news media, as is
exemplified in a 2014 Chicago Tribune piece by Steve Chapman. In that piece, Chapman
similarly positioned the city’s taxi companies as a “cartel” and mimicked Uber’s
customer-centric ethos in the piece’s final line: “The (taxi) industry has had its way for decades.
It's time to put consumers in the driver's seat” (Chapman 2014).
Generally, the younger, cosmopolitan rider demographic that Uber’s services attract is
prone to embrace products and services (and by extension the companies that produce them) that
seem to exhibit the very progressive, forward-thinking ethos that they believe to embody
themselves. Understanding this, Uber has tailored its corporate communication to commonly
include such rhetoric. The examples of this are numerous and include, most prominently,
references to the company’s labor practices as “the future of independent work” in its IPO
prospectus, chief counsel Tony West referring to a company policy platform as “progressive”
and “geared toward the 21st century economy” and a piece of company-sponsored legislation
that situates the company’s controversial labor practices as “the modern economy” (S-1 2019,
93; “Press Call” 2019, 2; “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act,” 2). These rhetorical
choices endow Uber’s labor practices and overall business model with an air of inevitability, as
they implicitly tie these practices to unavoidable, undeniable phenomena like the passage of
time. Under such logic, the opposite implication applies to taxi companies. If Uber’s business
model is “geared toward the 21st century economy” and its executives have explicitly named the
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taxi industry as the company’s chief adversary, taxi companies become cast as entities unfit to
serve modern societal needs.
Appeals to such widely accepted and highly regarded ideals, especially when they are
effectively employed as they have been in Uber’s case, force regulators into making exceedingly
difficult choices regarding how to approach regulating the companies that claim to pursue these
ideals. Anti-regulatory appeals based upon innovation and progressivism, regardless of their
earnestness, are impactful due to the potentially damaging political implications for those
regulators and elected officials who reject such appeals. Namely, regulators and politicians who
are skeptical of or reject such appeals do so at the risk of being portrayed by Uber and its allies
as status quoists who prefer the outdated, corrupt taxi system over the new, democratic and
efficient TNC model. If they do choose to pursue meaningful regulation, they risk being painted
as complacent, hostile to innovation, or worse, corrupt. If they take a hands-off approach, they
not only shirk their core responsibilities as agents of public service, but they risk allowing and
even incentivizing a litany of labor violations, financial improprieties, and public safety hazards.
The fashioning of corporate identity through conflating Uber’s newfangled business
model with cultural and economic progressivism is exemplified in a series of comments made by
Uber’s chief counsel Tony West during a September 2019 conference call with the press
discussing AB5’s impacts on the company’s operations. Throughout this call, West repeatedly
referred to Uber as a “progressive company,” even going as far as conflating it with California’s
“progressivism” as a state and his belief “as a Californian that California can always lead the
nation, especially when it comes to innovative solutions” (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 5). Through
this rhetorical tactic, West is attempting to accomplish two things. First, he is pressuring
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legislators to “prove” their bonafides as politicians that embody the state’s progressive reputation
by supporting Uber’s “progressive” alternative to AB5. In doing so, West is also attempting to
embed Uber’s own corporate identity into California’s reputation as a progressive state in pursuit
of a more favorable regulatory environment. While these claims are not patently false, they are
nonetheless a prime example of attributing cultural or personal characteristics to a corporate
entity in efforts to prevent regulation and manufacture consent. The regulatory calculus that this
rhetoric invites becomes even more fraught when public opinion comes into consideration, an
addition that Uber not only welcomes but has a history of actively courting. Messaging that
similarly positioned AB5 - and by extension the politicians who supported it - as regressive
could be found in dozens of smaller local papers throughout California around the time of the
bill’s passage. A prime example of such rhetoric being perpetuated through news media is an
article syndicated in a number of commonly-owned local news outlets across California in
September 2019 which states that “AB5 will restrict drivers’ freedom by imposing an outdated
employment status model on a new, innovative, and expanding sector of the economy” (Wilford
2019).
As is the case with many aspects of Uber’s foundational corporate identity, this
antagonism toward regulatory authority fashioned as technocratic, pseudo-populist
empowerment came straight from the mind of Travis Kalanick. This stance can be whittled down
to a supremely revelatory quote given by Kalanick during a 2011 interview with the tech
industry-focused podcast “This Week in Startups,” in which he states “our product is so superior
to the status quo that if we give people the opportunity to see it or try it, in any place in the world
where government has to be at least somewhat responsive to the people, they will demand it and
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defend its right to exist” (This Week in Startups, 2011). This sentiment, which became known by
those within the company’s corporate structure as “Travis’ Law,” came to define Uber’s growth
strategy and would eventually play a pivotal role in its anti-regulatory advocacy as well (Stone
2018, 195). In order to achieve such a level of customer loyalty, however, the company first
needed to develop a product that would elicit not only high levels of customer satisfaction but
reliance upon the company as well. Thus, creating a customer experience that was as “seamless,
easy and enjoyable” as possible became a core concern for Kalanick and his cohort of coders,
marketers, executives and salespeople, with Kalanick even announcing “customer obsession” as
one of the company’s fourteen guiding principles in a 2015 internal presentation (Isaac 2019,
9-10).
In this mission, Uber has been undeniably successful. In comparison to traditional taxi
services, the Uber customer experience is widely seen as an upgrade in terms of reliability and
efficiency. The issue with this logic emerges when Uber’s proprietary technologies, which
produce part of its competitive advantage over traditional taxi services, are marketed as the only
source of such advantage. Thus, the fact that the company’s myriad acts of regulatory arbitrage stealing trade secrets, misclassifying workers and systemically enabling a combative and hostile
workplace culture - have also played a role in securing these advantages, is largely obscured
from public view and erased from Uber’s corporate identity (Wakabayashi 2018; Farviar 2019;
Tait 2020). The effectiveness of this messaging is based upon the deep-seated belief that
technological innovation inevitably breeds increasingly favorable outcomes of both economic
and social variety, a belief that dovetails with broader progressive ideology in such a way that
innovation’s unsavory implications and potential applications come to seem negligible. In his
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theory of technological solutionism, Evgeny Morozov posits that this sort of single-minded
pursuit of efficiency is prone to mischaracterizing inefficient aspects of preexisting structures as
problematic when, in practice, they may be in place to achieve any number of non
efficiency-based goals (Morozov 2013, 9-10). By this logic, some of the “inefficiencies” Uber
was attempting to eliminate from the traditional taxi model, namely long wait times,
comprehensive driver background checks and cash payment, at once negatively impacted
systemic efficiency but were beneficial in other regards like drivers’ economic stability and the
system’s overall safety.
Despite its rhetorical efficacy, the goal of maximizing customer convenience is actually
at odds with another of Uber’s other expressed corporate values. One of the company’s most
common defenses of its labor practices is its insistence that a vast majority of its drivers work
part time, thus exempting the company from classifying drivers as full time employees and
taking on the additional responsibilities that come with that classification. However, a 2016
study by UCLA Law Professor Noah Zatz found that it was not Uber’s large pool of part time
and hobbyist drivers that allowed the company to achieve the level of customer satisfaction and
systemic efficiency it so fervently pursued, but the portion of their workforce that drove more
than 15 hours per week (Zatz 2016). Specifically, Zatz’s study found that drivers who work more
than 15 hours per week, while only making up 49% of the company’s driver workforce, provided
81% of its total rides. (Zatz 2016). Therefore, the maintenance of the company’s standard of
efficiency and by extension customer satisfaction is at odds with its continued insistence that part
time and hobbyist drivers are the core of its workforce. While the conflation of
technologically-enabled change with societal progress and prioritization of customer satisfaction
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may have served to quell popular concern with Uber’s employment practices and overall growth
strategy, the ways that the company ultimately focused this broad base of customer support and
reliance are even more revelatory of its corporate identity.
To be sure, the primary goal of Uber’s unflinching pursuit of customer satisfaction and
reliance through appeals to progressive ideals and maximizing systemic efficiency is to generate
as much revenue as possible, as is the case for all corporations. A key byproduct of these
pursuits, however, has been Uber’s ability to leverage customers’ reliance on their services into
political support in its myriad regulatory battles. Essentially an extension of “Travis’ Law,” this
tactic has been a tenet of the company’s ethos from its beginning, but was fashioned into a
formidable weapon with the hiring Ben Metcalfe, who would eventually lead the company’s
“Public Policy Innovation Team” (Isaac 2019, 117). A self-described builder of “custom tools to
support citizen engagement across legislative matters” to drive “social good and social change,”
Metcalfe and his team built tools within the rider version of the Uber app that notified users of
legislative matters that could jeopardize Uber’s operations in a given city (Isaac 2019, 117). With
the push of a button, riders could send messages or sign online petitions expressing their
opposition to such legislation, constituting a new form of digitally-enabled, low-information,
low-effort issue advocacy. What further incited such fervent support among customers was
Uber’s known willingness to completely abandon markets the company deemed insufficiently
amenable to its business and labor practices, as it did with Austin, Texas in 2016 (Kelly 2016).
The efficacy of mobilizing political support from customers through in-app messaging has been
staggering, as the company amassed 450,000 signatures by 2015, a mere five months after
Metcalfe’s hiring (Helderman 2014). Aside from the sheer amount of support this tactic has been
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able to garner, its quasi-grassroots nature serves to reinforce the very progressive,
people-powered identity that Uber has long sought to establish for itself. This seemingly
overwhelming popular support becomes additionally problematic, however, when one considers
the manner by which Uber initially drew customers to its platform.
To accompany its technology-based competitive advantage, Uber’s original operations
manager Austin Geidt devised a “rollout playbook” which outlined the company’s strategy of
attracting business by flooding a city’s market with considerably valuable coupons, sign-up
bonuses and various other incentives aimed at both potential drivers and riders (Lashinsky 2015).
This allowed the company to rapidly build up both its ridership and driver supply, oftentimes
before local transportation officials were even aware of the company’s presence in their city or
the illegality of its practices. By the time officials became privy to Uber’s operations and
prepared to penalize the company for its lawlessness, Uber had built up sufficient goodwill
amongst its drivers and riders to get them to advocate on its behalf. Once this “playbook”
produced concessions in one locality, Geidt “systematized the approach on an internal company
Wikipedia-like page, creating a playbook for city launches. Send in a launch team to Seattle, San
Antonio, Chicago - wherever - have them follow the playbook, and watch the demand flywheel
begin to spin” (Isaac 2019, 63). A scaled-up version of this “playbook” and its underlying logic
of weaponizing customer satisfaction into political support has guided Uber through a number of
its more recent and higher-stakes regulatory battles, which the following section of this research
will discuss in greater depth.
It is important, however, to first reflect upon the implications of Uber’s tactic of
weaponizing customer satisfaction and reliance on their product into political support. Much like
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the company’s vague yet effective appeals to its identification with progressive ideals, its
weaponization of customers’ satisfaction presents a vexing dilemma to the regulators and
legislators who are the targets of these supporters’ appeals. Popular outcry, regardless of its
authenticity or origins, cannot simply go unexamined or overlooked by serious, well-intentioned
public servants. When responding to this popular outcry means ignoring claims of worker
misclassification and defiance of local transportation laws, however, officials must choose
whether to prioritize the satisfaction of a sizable and vocal subset of constituents or keep with
their statutory responsibilities as regulators. A byproduct of Uber’s singular focus on achieving
customer satisfaction via systemic efficiency is the company’s tendency to whittle its regulatory
battles down to similarly stark, binary terms. In other words, what is truly a multi-faceted issue
that encompasses labor policy, traffic systems, and public safety is, through such customer
mobilization, oversimplified into a consumer issue alone. While consumer preference and
convenience is important - especially when a service as fundamental as transportation is in
question - its overemphasis in this case obscures other key interests at play including proper
worker classification and adherence to established safety standards. Obscuring and marginalizing
the myriad implications of regulating an entity like Uber ultimately serves to undermine
concerns regarding the working conditions of the company’s drivers, thus reifying the
company’s own prioritization of its largely bourgeoise customer base over its working-class
drivers and adopting the same class-based prioritization on a governmentally-recognized level.
Such weaponization of customer support is but one of the many tactics Uber is known to
employ in efforts to fashion a favorable corporate identity and avoid the regulation of its labor
practices, virtually all of which have been included in the company’s multi-pronged campaign in
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opposition to AB5. The various tactics of this campaign, as well as how they reflect and intersect
with different aspects of Uber’s corporate identity, will be discussed at length in the following
case study.

b. Case Study: Uber’s Anti-AB5 Campaign
Before an analysis of the various strategies that Uber has employed in its efforts to
prevent the passage of AB5 can be conducted, it is necessary to provide context for the uniquely
contentious nature of the fight over AB5’s passage and enforcement. At the core of this
contention are, unsurprisingly, massive financial considerations, as California accounted for
roughly 17% of Uber’s total revenue in the US as of May 2019 (Griswold 2019). The potential
reclassification of the company’s California-based drivers as employees, which is a
commonly-anticipated outcome of AB5’s passage, would significantly increase the company’s
operating costs in the state, delivering a considerable blow to its already shaky financial outlook.
Common estimates of the additional costs for employers associated with utilizing employee
rather than independent contract labor range from 20-30%, largely due to employers’ obligation
to provide certain non-wage benefits to their employees. A 2019 study commissioned by
Barclays attempted to quantify the additional costs Uber would incur upon the reclassification of
its California-based drivers more exactly, its findings reiterating the massive financial stakes of
AB5’s passage and ultimate enforcement. Specifically, the Barclays study found that accounting
for the additional benefits, and taxes would cost Uber $3,625 per driver annually (Griswold
2019). Based on Barclays’ estimate that the company has 140,000 drivers in California, the total
cost of reclassification would amount to a staggering $508 million (Griswold 2019).
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The short term financial impact of AB5’s passage seemed similarly dire, as the bill’s path
through the California State Legislature coincided almost directly with Uber’s Initial Public
Offering, which took place on May 10, 2019. As was explicitly stated in Uber’s IPO prospectus,
ongoing uncertainty regarding the employment status of the company’s drivers is one of the most
significant risks the company faces on its path toward profitability, and news of a law that could
reclassify drivers as employees in the company’s largest US market likely did little to quell
potential investors’ fears of such a risk (S-1 2019, 28). To be sure, Uber’s disappointing IPO which saw the company’s stock price fall by 7.6% on its first day of public trading, lowering its
total valuation from estimates of nearing of $120 billion to $75.65 billion - was also caused by
larger market forces including rising trade-based tensions between the US and China and Lyft’s
similarly poor IPO performance two months prior (Feiner 2019). However, ongoing concerns
over the driver classification question accentuated by the AB5’s movement through the
California Legislature surely contributed to the stock’s poor initial performance as well. In
tandem with the financial implications that animated Uber’s actions against AB5, the
maintenance of corporate prestige was likely a significant motivation as well. The financial blow
dealt by AB5 would arguably be compounded by the unfavorable optics of Uber’s home state,
which also contains the very first market the company entered, rebuking a central tenet of the
company’s business model.
Uber’s efforts to prevent AB5’s passage throughout Summer 2019, while the bill was
making its way through the California State Assembly and Senate, were threefold. Perhaps the
most ambitious and publicly impactful of Uber’s tactics was the package of internal reforms it
proposed to California lawmakers as an alternative to legislation that would reclassify the
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company’s drivers. The proposal included scaled-down versions of many of the benefits that
employee status would afford drivers including on-the-job injury protections, health benefits and
a wage floor, but maintained drivers’ status as independent contractors. Although it did not
successfully prevent AB5’s passage or lead to Uber receiving an exemption from the law’s
“ABC” test for employment status, many of the proposal’s provisions found their way into a
piece of Uber-sponsored legislation called the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act,”
which aims to firmly establish the company’s drivers as independent contractors. The specific
provisions of “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act” and its insights into Uber’s
corporate identity will be discussed at length in the following section of this analysis, as it
constitutes a major part of Uber’s anti-regulatory strategy.
This counter-proposal, which was first announced to the public in September 2019, was
positioned by Uber’s spokespeople as a symbol of good faith and a desire to compromise with
regulators. This intent was made abundantly clear in the company’s communications in the
immediate wake of AB5’s passage, in which chief counsel Tony West remarked “we’ll continue
to advocate for a compromise agreement and we were encouraged by Governor Newsom’s
comments as reported by the Wall Street Journal this morning that he’s fully committed to
negotiating a solution” (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 4). This corporate identity-building tactic of
appealing to compromise and cooperation in an effort to come across as level-headed and
amenable to criticism was likely geared toward winning the favor of the general public rather
than lawmakers specifically, as Uber’s counter-proposal was made public with only one week
left in the 2019 legislative calendar. Sentiments aligned with West’s rhetoric in the post-AB5
press call cropped up in opinion columns of newspapers throughout California around the time of
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AB5’s passage, as is exemplified in an August 2019 Sacramento Bee o pinion column in which
the author argues that “legislators are uniquely positioned to protect flexible, on-demand work
while simultaneously improving work quality and security. That is, as long as they take seriously
the recent path forward jointly offered up by the leaders of Lyft and Uber” (Leroe-Munoz 2019).
In the very same series of remarks, West denied that the company engaged in any
closed-door lobbying of state legislators in opposition to AB5, adding that company did not
formally oppose the bill until its final round of amendments was announced, seemingly
reiterating the company’s commitment to maintaining the visage of a cordial and collaborative
relationship with its regulators (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 9). According to the California
Secretary of State Cal-Access Lobbying Archives, however, Uber did in fact engage in extensive
lobbying in the first three quarters of 2019, spending $549,513 to lobby legislators on a total of
15 different senate and assembly bills including AB5 (California Secretary of State, n.d.).
Though the exact contents of these lobbying efforts are unknown to the public, the fact that
Uber’ counter-proposal was circulated with one week remaining in the year’s legislative session
lends to the notion that a majority of the company’s AB5-related lobbying did not concern this
proposal (Said 2019). It is considerably more likely that these efforts, given their relatively
long-term nature, were geared toward securing “ABC” test exemptions for TNCs and convincing
legislators to oppose the bill in its entirety. Regardless of their exact contents, the fact that these
efforts were vehemently denied by Uber’s primary spokesperson in the very same public
statement in which he championed the company’s cooperative and transparent approach to
engaging regulators points to an incongruity between the company’s desired corporate identity
and its actual approach toward lobbying and engaging with regulators more generally.
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Accompanying the company’s lobbying of state legislators was its incessant courting of
driver opposition to AB5. This strategy centered on the oft-used tactic of sending messages and
action items directly to drivers’ apps, which both Uber and Lyft did repeatedly throughout
Summer 2019 (Ghaffary 2019). These messages, which consisted of vague appeals to “protecting
driver flexibility” and never referred to AB5 by name, received very little attention from the
media, with only a handful of industry specific publications and driver-focused blogs reporting
substantively on this intriguing development (Ghaffary 2019). Though Uber has employed
similar tactics aimed at its riders with considerable success in previous instances, there is little
available data on the efficacy of such messaging when aimed toward drivers.
In order to more comprehensively understand these efforts, I conducted a survey of 40
California-based drivers, gauging their opinions on the efficacy and appropriateness of such
messaging, as well as their general thoughts on companies sending political messaging to their
employees more generally. To be sure, the number of drivers surveyed is too small to be a
statistically significant depiction of California’s overall driver population, but I contend that this
format allowed me to contact a higher number of drivers than individually-administered
substantive interviews would have. Further, it is important to note that the survey was also open
to Lyft drivers, as the survey was designed and initially disseminated before the scope of this
research was limited to Uber. The selection of responding drivers was slightly skewed by the
method that the survey was administered, which was through online driver forums and social
media groups. Of the 40 respondents, 54% have been driving for at least 3 years and 58% drive
at least 30 hours per week, representing a considerably longer overall tenure and larger workload
than Uber’s own reports on driver habits designate. This skew toward long-term, full-time
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drivers is reflective of the subpopulation of drivers who are most active on online driver forums
and social media groups, as they are likely more inclined to value and utilize the information
shared on these groups - which runs the gamut from income maximization strategies to
discussions on company policy to sharing stories about ill-behaved passengers - than new
drivers, part-timers, or hobbyists.
According to respondents, Uber and Lyfts’ outreach attempts were incessant, as 39% of
drivers claimed to have received 5 or more messages from their respective TNC throughout
summer 2019. Though an additional 30% of respondents were unsure how many messages they
received, the fact that more drivers reported receiving 5 messages than all lower numbers
combined speaks to the likelihood of drivers being contacted multiple times. While 80% of
drivers were asked to sign petitions in these messages, 69% thought that these messages were
clearly communicated and not misleading, making the probability of drivers mistakenly or
unintentionally signing such petitions rather low. While these messages were not considered
particularly insidious, respondents did not find them to be very persuasive or agreeable either, as
67% of drivers claimed that these messages had very little or minimal impact on their opinions
on schedule flexibility. In an effort to gain a more detailed understanding of their initial reactions
to these messages, the survey also included space for respondents to elaborate on their thoughts
at length. Of these responses, 37.5% featured negative sentiments, with multiple drivers
suspecting these messages to have self-serving, disingenuous motives, while only 5% of
responses expressed positive reactions to the messages. The remaining 37.5% of responses were
neutral, most of which flatly stating that the respondent knew the messages were about AB5 with
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no additional context of the respondent’s thoughts on the matter. Below are examples of positive,
negative and neutral answers that are representative of the group’s general tenor.

Positive

Neutral

Negative

“As they said protecting the
flexibility”

“They want us to stay classifed
as independent contractors”

“I thought they were a scam and
trying to mislead us”

“I was concerned about losing
my ability to earn”

“About AB5 and not wanting it
passed”

“I was angry. Rideshare
companies are manipulating and
deceiving drivers to act against
drivers best interests.”

“Support them”

“Preventing AB5”

“They were f****** b***s***
a** ploys to trick drivers into
supporting the companies which
have repeatedly shown they dont
f****** care.. greedy bastards.”

Respondents were split on whether they felt pressure to conform with the point of view
expressed in Uber and Lyfts’ messages, but only 22% claimed that their views on the matter
were in any way altered by these messages. This intriguing dynamic may indicate that this
tactic’s partisan, propagandic nature was simply too transparent to earnestly change drivers’
pre-existing opinions, but a common reluctance to admit susceptibility to propaganda (especially
when it is being served by one’s employer) amongst respondents likely contributed toward this
outcome as well. Respondents’ long average tenure with Uber and Lyft also explains the
negative responses to these messages, as these are the very drivers who have become accustomed
to the fallout from these companies’ recurring political and legal struggles being hoisted upon
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them through consistently shifting company policies, company-mandated fare decreases, and a
general lack of workplace autonomy. A common theme amongst both the survey responses I
received as well as the discourse in the online driver forums I observed was a generalized
skepticism toward all company-sponsored initiatives and policy changes, largely stemming from
the belief amongst longer-tenured drivers that such changes often result in improved conditions
for the company, but less beneficial for drivers.
When queried about their thoughts on the appropriateness of companies sending political
messages to their employees in general, respondents’ opinions were split rather evenly. While
41% find it inappropriate for companies to send their workers political messages, 33% believe it
depends on the relevance of the political issue at hand to either the company as a whole or the
worker’s role specifically and another 18% think such messaging is appropriate regardless of its
relevance. The variety in response to this question indicates the nuance that emerges when such
messaging is considered in the abstract, as opposed to respondents’ markedly negative response
to political messaging from their employers regarding AB5 specifically. While the transmission
of this sort of information in and of itself may be seen as favorable, the biases of the messenger,
especially in circumstances where workers' livelihoods may be at risk, seem to be the primary
cause for concern.
The question that lies at the core of this debate is whether drivers prefer to be
independent contractors or employees. In many of its official AB5-related communications, Uber
has cited that the “vast majority” of drivers wish to remain independent contractors largely due
to their desire to retain schedule flexibility (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 3). Despite their negative
reaction to Uber and Lyfts’ messaging on the topic, 56% of survey respondents expressed the
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desire to remain independent contractors, while 25% preferred employee status and the
remaining 17% had no strong preference. This result is made all the more surprising when it’s
considered alongside the fact that almost 33% of respondents drive over 40 hours per week,
which is the threshold for full time status under the California Labor Code. Of those who work
over 40 hours per week, 38% preferred employee status, a notable increase from the overall
proportion but still lower than one might anticipate. This preference for independent contractor
status is further illuminated by the fact that driving is the primary source of income for only 45%
of respondents, meaning that a majority either have additional forms of employment other than
driving or have family members who contribute significantly to their household’s total income.
This dynamic helps explain the lack of desire for the benefits and other protections that full-time
employment status legally requires, as those for whom driving is not the primary source of
income are more likely to receive these benefits from other sources including.
Ultimately, Uber’s strategy of whipping legislative opposition to AB5 through compiling
driver support via petition was unsuccessful, as the California Senate passed the bill on
September 11, 2019 and Governor Newsom signed the bill into law exactly one week later.
Spanning both before and after AB5’s passage, Uber has embarked on a campaign to exempt
itself from the bill’s provisions by employing rhetorical and legal tactics that were varied,
expansive and often contradictory, creating an increasingly muddled and amorphous corporate
identity intended to take whichever shape that proved most effective at staving off the harshest
effects of this regulatory measure.
The first tactic aimed at exempting Uber from AB5’s provisions was actually in practice
well before AB5 was signed into law. Throughout 2018 and 2019, Uber expanded its
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transportation offerings substantially, starting with the purchase of e-bike and scooter rental
company Jump in April 2018. In a post-purchase phone call with the tech industry publication
TechCrunch C
 EO Dara Koshrowhahi explained the decision as one intended to make Uber’s
transportation offerings more comprehensive, noting that “We see the Uber app as moving from
just being about car sharing and car hailing to really helping the consumer get from A to B in the
most affordable, most dependable, most convenient way. And we think e-bikes are just a
spectacularly great product” (Dickey 2018). The company’s expansion only accelerated from
that point, as its announcement of a feature available on the Uber app in certain cities that allows
users to “see nearby public transit stops and real-time departure information,” on January 1, 2019
marked the beginning of a series of increasingly ambitious expansions aimed at drastically
reconfiguring the company (“Sometimes the fast lane is the bus lane” 2019). The “Uber Transit”
announcement was followed up three months later (and mere weeks before Uber’s IPO) by an
expansion of the company’s Autonomous Vehicle Group, marked by the announcement of a $1
billion fundraising round and $7.25 billion valuation with contributions coming from the likes of
Toyota and SoftBank (Conger 2019). The company made headlines again in July with its
unveiling of Uber Copter, a helicopter chartering service offering weekday service between
Manhattan and John F Kennedy International Airport that was billed as “the future of urban air
mobility” (“Introducing Uber Copter” 2019). In perhaps the most extreme deviation from its
original business, Uber announced its entrance into the financial services sector in October 2019
with Uber Money - a suite of financial products including debit and credit cards for the
company’s drivers and riders alike with the goal of “adding additional value for the Uber
community, all at Uber speed” (Hazelhurst 2019). The unbridled ambition and aggressiveness
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that the company exhibited in its pursuit of five new ventures within an eighteen month period is
newsworthy in its own right, but elicits a deeper analysis when considered within the context of
the company’s IPO and its efforts to avoid the regulation of its labor practices by AB5.
Uber’s rapid and multi-directional expansion in the months surrounding its IPO was
interpreted by many observers in the finance sector and financial press as an attempt at bolstering
and justifying the company’s valuation while quelling potential investors’ fears regarding the
company’s history of staggering financial losses (Trainer 2019; Conger 2019). While the
company’s ride-hailing service had only ever operated at immense losses - reaching $3 billion in
2018 - its expansion into areas as diverse as e-bikes, helicopters and financial services was seen
as an attempt at enhancing its prospects for future profitability and growing its overall market
cap. It seemed as though ride-hailing had taken Uber as far as it could, and the only options for
continued growth were in other businesses. The financial justification for this puzzling
expansion, however, does not address the regulatory and rhetorical goals it seemingly also
intended to accomplish. For a company to fulfill part “B” of AB5’s “ABC” test for employment,
it must prove that its independent contract workers “perform work that is outside the usual
course of the hiring entity’s business,” a condition that would seem to be difficult for Uber to
prove in regards to its drivers. In the company’s IPO prospectus, an official document disclosing
all information deemed relevant to potential investors and filed with the SEC, Uber’s ride-hailing
and food delivery services are distinguished as its “core platform,” with ride-hailing alone
accounting for roughly 82% of the company’s revenue in 2018 (S-1 2019, 2; S-1 2019, 18-22).
Such a distinction would seem to position the company’s drivers (of both the food delivery and
ride hailing varieties), who perform labor that constitutes the “core” of the company’s business,
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as employees under the “ABC” test’s qualifications. By involving itself in a litany of new
industries in the months immediately preceding AB5’s passage, Uber was attempting to build its
case against the regulatory statute applying to its drivers. Though it is highly unlikely that any of
the company’s recently launched ventures will overtake ride hailing as its primary revenue
stream, the mere fact that the Uber app has grown to encompass a considerably wider menu of
services outside the realm of ride hailing bolsters the company’s long-standing anti-regulatory
argument that its product is a technological platform that connects producers and consumers of
various services. Essentially, ride hailing becomes less of Uber’s “usual course of business” as
additional service options are added to its platform, obscuring the true nature of its business.
Rather than solely relying on this argument as its defense against AB5’s "ABC" test applying to
its drivers, however, Uber began rolling out a number of changes to its systems of driver
administration in California with the intent of satisfying the “ABC” test’s conditions in the
months immediately following AB5’s passage.
In a December 2019 blog post directed toward its California-based drivers titled
“Keeping you in the Drivers’ Seat,” Uber announced a number of new features for drivers it
would be rolling out in the ensuing months. Such features and tweaks included “displaying trip
time, expected earning range and destination upfront (before a driver accepts the ride),” the
ability to “build your business” by allowing riders to “request their favorite drivers when
scheduling a trip in advance” and assurance that ride acceptance rates would no longer impact
drivers’ “Uber Pro” status and access to “Uber Pro Rewards” (“To California Drivers: Keeping
you in the driver's seat,” 2019). Prior to these changes, Uber’s control over their drivers’
workflows was considerably more noticeable, as drivers were essentially forced to accept rides
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while knowing virtually nothing about their destination, the estimated duration of the ride or the
fare they would receive. To be sure, drivers had the option to cancel rides after initially accepting
them, but doing so would lead to a decline in their “driver rating,” which is what some drivers
and researchers believe partially determines the quantity and quality of ride offers that a driver
receives (Rosenblat 2018, 95). Under the amended system announced in the “Keeping you in the
Driver’s Seat” blog post, drivers have access to detailed previews of what their prospective ride
will entail in terms of duration, fare, route and ultimate destination, ostensibly giving them more
autonomy over their workflow and and the semblance of independence.
Uber followed this up with a second set of updates unveiled roughly one month later in
another blog post. This time, the company announced that its fare structures would be
streamlined and made more transparent, largely through the implementation of a uniform cap on
“service fees'' for UberX rides and expansion of the “upfront pricing” model to UberPOOL rides
(“To California Drivers: Keeping you in the driver’s seat, part 2” 2020). The changes announced
in these two blog posts point to an attempt by uber Uber to exempt itself from part “A” of the
AB5 “ABC test,” which states that a worker is an independent contractor if “the person is free
from the control and direction of the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the
work.” To be sure, many of these changes seem genuinely beneficial for drivers, as they
ostensibly provide increased levels of workflow autonomy and independence. In an FAQ section
at the bottom of this blog post, however, it is disclosed that these changes were being
implemented due to “changing laws in California '' and that they would apply only to drivers
operating in the state (“To California Drivers: Keeping you in the driver's seat” 2019). This
addendum makes Uber’s intentions seem considerably less altruistic than one might initially
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believe, pointing to legal necessity as their driving force rather than an earnest, altruistic effort to
empower and assist drivers.
This argument was further strengthened in late January 2020 when Uber unveiled its plan
to allow drivers to set their own fares for rides originating at certain small-scale airports
throughout the state, perhaps the most extreme concession of the entire suite of changes (Brown
2020). It is important to note, however, that driver autonomy is still limited in this new structure,
as drivers will only be able to set fares up to five times higher than the company’s base fare
(Brown 2020). By decreasing the punishments for rejecting rides, providing trip information
before drivers are to accept rides, and allowing drivers to set their own fares in certain
circumstances, Uber is seemingly providing its California drivers with opportunities to create
more stable, controllable work structures that would lend themselves to AB5’s definition of
independent contract work. This response by Uber harkens back to Veena Dubal’s findings from
her case studies of successful class action misclassification suits mounted by taxi and delivery
drivers. In one of the cases Dubal’s research focuses on, FedEx responds to a court finding its
delivery drivers to be employees by “using the court’s decision as a road map” and “drawing on
their legal and business acumen to alter their business model so that workers looked even less
like employees under the established case law” (Dubal 2017, 747). To be sure, in neither Uber
or FedEx’s case do these changes fundamentally alter the companies’ business models, as drivers
must still complete rides supplied to them by the company if they wish to earn money and lack
the bargaining power through which they could negotiate wages or fare splits between
themselves and the company.
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While various aspects of the blog posts in which Uber announced these changes point to
the potentially duplicitous nature of their origins, their calculated and transactional nature comes
into sharp relief when considered in tandem with another primary aspect of its anti-AB5 strategy:
outright denial of the law’s applicability to the company. Nowhere was this perspective more
clearly elucidated than in the press phone call organized by Uber chief counsel Tony West that
took place on the day of the law’s passage through the California Senate. After spending the first
portion of the call clearing up a number of the journalists’ misconceptions about AB5 and its
impact on Uber - namely that the law does not automatically reclassify drivers but rather subjects
companies who use independent contract labor to a more stringent test to prove correct
classification - West resorts to one of Uber’s foundational rhetorical tactics: pitting regulators
against drivers. Specifically, West mentions that while AB5’s applicability to Uber’s drivers in
California remains in question, “because we continue to believe that drivers are properly
classified as independent, and because we’ll continue to be responsive to what the vast majority
of drivers tell us they want most - flexibility - drivers will not automatically be reclassified as
employees even after January of next year” (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 3). This quote puts the
supposed collective will of the company’s drivers in direct contention with regulators’ duty to
determine the applicability of relevant laws to the individuals and organizations in question. In
using this rhetorical tactic, West shifts focus away from Uber the corporation and depicts the
impasse as one between its struggling working class drivers and a punitive, out of touch state
government. This instance is another example of a high-level representative of Uber fashioning
the company’s identity as an engine of economic populism fighting for the rights and perceived
interests of its workers against an ossified, unresponsive government bureaucracy. The ultimate
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impact of such a tactic remains to be seen. However, markedly similar tactics have animated a
significant part of Uber’s post-AB5 repertoire, and their extended application will be discussed
in further detail later in this research.
Perhaps the most striking part about this remark, however, is the fact that it is largely
invalidated by the operational changes that the company would roll out over the ensuing months
with the express intent of helping it conform to the new regulatory landscape. If the company’s
executives and attorneys truly did not believe that AB5’s "ABC" test would apply to their
drivers, it is highly unlikely that they would go through the trouble of altering the company’s
systems of driver administration in one of its most lucrative markets, nor would they willfully
cede control over fare levels and driver acceptance rates. Uber’s rhetoric in terms of its relations
with drivers is rife with vague allusions to empowerment through innovation - a time honored
Silicon Valley trope - but its lengthy history of doing wrong by its drivers in terms of their
wages, safety and workplace autonomy leaves little reason to put stock in the company's
performative altruism. Towards the end of the call, West alludes to the company’s intention to
“adapt” to the new regulatory environment when he claims “One thing I do know is that this
business is incredibly adaptable and has withstood enormous, enormous challenges to both its
business model as well as other things, and it has always come through those stronger and more
responsive” (“Uber Press Call” 2019, 12). This statement, aside from resembling an admission of
the company’s non-compliance under its pre-AB5 business model, reifies the antagonistic,
adversarial relationship between Uber and its regulators that has its origins in “Travis’ Law” and
the company’s growth strategy as a whole. Further, West’s use of the word “adapt” is instructive
of the company’s ongoing attempt at stylizing its business model and corporate identity as
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virtuous rather than simply illegal, as “adaptation” typically holds a positive connotation that
would seem to belie the treacherous circumstances facing the company at that time. In using this
phrasing, West is also attributing human characteristics to Uber as a corporation when in truth
the company’s misguided and often illegal practices are not perpetuated by some amorphous,
opaque legal construct but rather by a small cohort of executives and board members who
understand the potential implications of these actions well before actual repercussions like AB5
come to bear. This rhetoric acts as a smokescreen intended to deflect culpability away from any
individual Uber executive, representative, or any being theoretically sensible enough to know
that breaking the law might court trouble. Rather, West is attempting to redirect any popular
animosity or anguish toward the outdated and unfair “system” that consistently burdens Uber
with regulations that force it to be “adaptable” in the first place. Ultimately, this statement is an
admission that Uber emphasizes different interpretations of its corporate identity depending on
the circumstances at hand, namely to satiate the fears and concerns of regulators, riders and
investors as regulatory standards continually shift.

c. The “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act” and the Focus on Flexibility
In the very same post-AB5 press call in which he downplayed Uber’s susceptibility to
AB5’s provisions, Tony West championed the company’s counter-proposal as a progressive
alternative to the overly-punitive AB5. Virtually all of this counter-offer’s provisions including a
wage floor, employer healthcare contribution, insurance for on-the-job injuries and enhanced
driver safety protocols were formalized and compiled into a piece of legislation called the
“Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act” (Protect App Based Drivers and Services, n.d.).
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This bill, which has been primarily funded and championed by some of the very companies it
will most directly benefit including Uber, Lyft and GrubHub, ultimately aims to exempt TNCs
from AB5’s "ABC" test by formally re-establishing their drivers as independent contractors
(Protect App Based Drivers and Services, n.d).
Aside from the bill’s actual provisions, the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services”
website also prominently features claims that the bill will “protect access to affordable and
convenient rideshare and delivery services” (Protect App Based Drivers and Services, n.d). With
this seemingly intentionally vague claim, the bill’s proponents are again attempting to weaponize
customer satisfaction and reliance on the status quo by insinuating that maintaining the level of
service these companies’ customers have become accustomed to would be untenable if AB5’s
“ABC” test reclassifies TNC drivers as employees. This argument was repeated nearly verbatim
in California-based media outlets like The Sacramento Bee, w
 hich ran an opinion column in
August 2019 that warned that AB5 “decreases the number of potential drivers available to meet
demand at any given time, thereby increasing consumer costs and wait times for passengers”
(Leroe-Munoz 2019). In truth, however, it is unclear what the impact on service level would be if
TNCs were to fail AB5’s “ABC test,” although the fact that prior research has found that the
company’s full-time drivers provide most of its service seems to at least partially disprove these
allegations (Zatz 2016). Nonetheless, the intent of such a statement is clear, as it aims to grossly
oversimplify what is truly a multi-faceted issue into one that hinges on consumer satisfaction and
convenience alone. While the Act’s provisions, which essentially amount to scaled-down
versions of many of the benefits normally afforded by employee status, represent little more than
a compromise position between full employment and independent contractor status, the
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messaging of the wider media campaign in support of the Act reveals far more about Uber’s
desired corporate identity and positionality relative to both the public and its regulators.
As of this research, there has shockingly been little public attention paid to the “Protect
App Based Drivers and Services Act” despite the facts that the Act has officially qualified for the
November 2020 California ballot and that the wider dispute over worker classification remains
hotly contested. Thus, the Act’s official website becomes the de facto primary avenue through
which one can analyze the messaging and rhetoric of the “Protect App Based Drivers and
Services” campaign. At first glance, very little about this website stands out from the typical
political campaign site - slick graphics that communicate the candidate or bill’s agenda in broad
strokes, glowing testimonials from a diverse coalition of community members and experts, a list
of endorsements from national and local organizations. When viewed within the context of the
act’s actual provisions, however, intriguing trends come to the fore. While the site includes brief
descriptions of each provision, the majority of the site’s messaging revolves around the concept
of “protecting driver flexibility.” The overemphasis on this concept in the website’s messaging is
most noticeable on the “driver stories” page, which contains 71 testimonials from drivers
working throughout California.
In efforts to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the campaign’s messaging, I
conducted an analysis of these testimonials - which are presented in both video and text-based
formats - to identify the themes, experiences and beliefs that animate these drivers’ preference to
remain independent contractors. Before this analysis can be discussed, however, it must be noted
that the site automatically cycles through a much larger set of testimonials, showing a selection
of 71 at any given time. Thus, my analysis, which was conducted on a single set of 71
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testimonials, may not be completely reflective of the unknown total amount of testimonials in the
campaign’s database. In these testimonials, the word “flexibility” was included a total of 104
times, while words that would imply drivers’ mentioning of other aspects of the Act (like a wage
floor or injury protection) were mentioned no more than three times each. While all but one
testimonial - submitted by a man named Jody C from Palmdale - carried the implicit theme of
desiring or needing schedule flexibility, 65% of drivers explicitly used the word “flexibility” in
their testimonials. Within this majority cohort, two primary subsets emerged. The largest
plurality of drivers, accounting for 48% of the total, cited familial responsibilities as the primary
reasoning for prioritizing flexibility over other concerns, while the remaining 17% cited needing
flexibility in order to pursue a specific career or academic goal. The sentiment that drivers value
flexibility above all other considerations has gained credence among pockets of the news media
as well, namely local outlets throughout California. A October 2019 opinion column in the Daily
News of Los Angeles titled “The high cost of ending independent labor,” which claims that
“lawmakers are out of touch, and drivers value the flexibility driving for Uber offers, which
allows them to meet family obligations,” echoes this sentiment almost verbatim (Kovacs 2019).
A complete list of these testimonials’ emergent themes can be found in Appendix B.
In efforts to gauge the extent to which the testimonials included on the “Protect App
Based Drivers and Services” website are skewed to over-represent drivers’ desire for
“flexibility,” I conducted an identical analysis of Uber’s own “driver stories” video series, which
can be found on the company’s YouTube page. This series, which consists of 62 videos that have
accumulated over 9.3 million views since the first video was published in September 2014,
serves as a control group for the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials because
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it spans multiple campaigns, issue areas and locations, thus providing a less case-specific
depiction of Uber’s desired corporate identity. Of the 62 Uber-specific “driver stories,” 42%
featured flexibility as a primary theme expressed either implicitly or explicitly. Of this 42%,
there were an equal number of videos featuring drivers citing family-based needs and
career/academic goals as their justification for prioritizing flexibility. Equally instructive of this
divergence is the fact that almost one third of the references to flexibility on Uber’s YouTube
page come from a single series published in November 2019. This series, titled “Stay Flexible,”
featured eight drivers from New York State explaining why Uber’s schedule flexibility is
important to their lives in a largely similar manner to the “Protect App Based Drivers and
Services” testimonials. Although the “Stay Flexible” videos do not mention this explicitly, they
were published one month after New York State Senator Diane Sevino announced her plan to
introduce legislation that would codify an "ABC" test similar to AB5’s into law (Opfer and
Clukey 2019). The thematic similarities between the “Stay Flexible” and “Protect App Based
Drivers and Services” campaigns reinforces the notion that, when faced with a legislative
challenge to its labor practices, Uber’s marketing and policy teams view “flexibility” as the most
powerful frame through which to express the company’s identity and state its case against driver
reclassification.
The hyper-focus on “flexibility” as the fulcrum on which the entire debate over driver
classification hinges risks dangerously oversimplifying what is in fact a multifaceted piece of
legislation that attempts to solve a complex problem. By solely displaying testimonials that
depict drivers’ desire for “flexibility” and making it the focal point of the website’s entire
messaging, Uber is obscuring the other provisions of the “Protect App Based Drivers and Service
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Act,” which is seemingly an attempt to misinform drivers and voters across the state alike. This
tactic functions in tandem with the almost complete lack of direct references to AB5 on the
website, as they both aim to curate knowledge on the topic in a manner that maximizes the
appeal of Uber and its allies’ position.
To further understand the reasoning behind this point of view, it is important to consider
the interplay taking place between the company’s appeals to “flexibility” and the dire economic
conditions of California’s working class. As wage levels remain largely stagnant and the social
safety net becomes increasingly threadbare, rising income inequality and overall cost of living
across the state expose working class Californians to immense levels of economic precarity.
Though these issues exist and are perpetuated at a scale that transcends the ongoing debate over
the classification of TNC drivers, their relevance to the daily lives of tens of millions of
Californians enhances the political efficacy of calls to “protect driver flexibility.” In many of the
“Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials, drivers describe their need for
“flexibility” as a byproduct of the precarity that is in danger of enveloping their lives. This
precarity can take countless different forms from material manifestations like job loss,
insufficient wages from a full time job and insufficient fixed-level retirement or disability
income to the psychological damage that chronic financial instability and uncertainty has been
known to perpetuate. In sum, 31 out of the 71 testimonials touched on themes of precarity, with
retirees supplementing fixed sources of income and workers supplementing the insufficient
wages from their non-driving full time job making up the majority of this sub-group.
While access to flexibly-scheduled work like driving for Uber is undoubtedly a viable
way for one experiencing economic precarity to supplement their income and gain stability, the
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role that “flexibility” plays in the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials
suggests that the company plays a far more fundamental role for in promoting economic justice
than a closer analysis would reveal. Essentially, these testimonials position Uber as a neutral
actor that provides people with a tool to try to overcome their precarious circumstances or
provide a safety net for emergency circumstances. This alters the associative relationship that
drivers and the public at large may have with Uber by obfuscating the true power and
decision-making ability that the company itself retains over drivers’ livelihoods. Namely, this
depiction obscures Uber’s own role in perpetuating or exacerbating this precarity by reserving
the right to unilaterally control virtually all aspects of drivers’ workflow from fare splits to trip
assignment. In its depiction of Uber as an entity that can provide increased levels of economic
security in ways that employers and governmental institutions are either no longer required or
able to provide, this messaging framework also serves to reinforce Uber’s self-perpetuated
corporate identity as a champion of economic empowerment and opportunity. In truth, however,
the “flexibility” that both the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services Act” as well as Uber’s
general corporate messaging champions is a misleadingly broad framework for a concept that
only significantly impacts the flexibility of drivers’ schedules. Throughout the “Protect App
Based Drivers and Services” website and testimonials, “flexibility” offered essentially as a
standalone concept, inviting the viewer to insinuate that the Act will introduce flexibility in all
aspects of drivers’ work. This is simply untrue, as the Act’s provisions feature a thin definition of
flexibility and do nothing to increase drivers’ agency over where they work, who they pick up or
what times of day are most lucrative to work. While some of Uber’s post-AB5 capitulations to
drivers in hopes of passing AB5’s “ABC” test do marginally increase driver agency by
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diminishing the penalties for rejecting rides, such policy changes do not decouple drivers’
earning capabilities from the control of Uber’s dispatch algorithm in a way that amounts to
full-fledged flexibility. That this argument is being made through driver testimonials and
companies claims of “what drivers tell us they want” only serves to reinforce its pseudo-populist
appeal and aggrandize its claims.
While flexibility-based appeals do in fact constitute the plurality of “driver stories”
videos on Uber’s YouTube page, other notable themes are apparent in this series as well.
Namely, this series includes videos extolling the social benefits of driving, connecting driving to
identity-based narratives of empowerment, and positioning driving as a way for people to earn
“extra” money. On the contrary, the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials exist
almost exclusively within the common thematic framework of flexibility. This is not to say,
however, that there is no thematic overlap between the YouTube “driver stories” and the “Protect
App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials. In fact, a sizable portion of the “Protect App
Based Drivers and Services” testimonials contain sub-themes that dovetail with those expressed
in the YouTube “driver stories.” However, the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services”
testimonials tend to depict these themes in more dire, less glamorous terms than the more
optimistic contents published on Uber’s YouTube page. This thematic divergence is indicative of
the messaging and issue framing that Uber and its co-sponsors sees as most politically salient
and persuasive in the context of a ballot initiative campaign.
A prime example of this thematic divergence and its impetus in the differing goals of the
respective campaigns is the manner in which each set of “driver stories” depicts drivers’
relationship to the money they earn driving. The YouTube “driver stories” typically cite drivers
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working to earn “extra money,” often within the context of a non-essential economic pursuit like
saving up for a vacation or funding a hobby. Such narratives are included in 42% of the
YouTube “driver stories,” while only 5% explicitly mention income from driving fulfilling an
economic need. Within the considerably more contentious context of a political campaign,
however, this trend reverses. The “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” testimonials feature
narratives of economic need and “extra money” almost equally, with economic need emerging in
25% of testimonials and “extra money” featuring in 20%. Further, allusions to drivers’ struggles
with keeping up with rising costs of living can be found in 8.4% of the “Protect App Based
Drivers and Services” testimonials and only 1.6% of the YouTube “driver stories,” a dynamic
that lends itself to California’s status as a uniquely expensive place to live as well as the
respective campaigns’ disparate goals. While the “Protect App Based Drivers and Services”
testimonials seem to be honing in on narratives of dire economic need compounded by myriad
structural obstacles under the assumption that such narratives will invite a wide base of political
support, the YouTube “driver stories” depict a considerably wider range of benefits associated
with driving, oftentimes eschewing an economic lens altogether.
Chief among the non-economic themes included in Uber’s “driver stories” YouTube
series is the company’s supposed role in empowering those who face marginalization and
discrimination based upon their race, gender identity, sexual orientation, level of physical ability
or age. In total, 31% of all YouTube “driver stories” focused on such a theme, often making only
vague connections between personal empowerment and driving for Uber specifically. Often, the
videos seemed to conflate the ability to earn money driving for Uber with much broader themes
of identity-based empowerment. Two videos in particular exemplify this misleading messaging,
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the first of which profiles a female driver from Brazil named Glaucia. After expressing pride in
her status as “the first female Uber driver to achieve a 5 star rating in Brazil,” Glaucia states “for
me, driving means freedom, independence, and I think it’s very important that women fight for
empowerment” (“Glaucia, São Paulo, Brazil” 2019). This quote represents an attempt by Uber to
directly link the ability to work for their company with the wider societal project of pursuing
gender equality without providing evidence of what exactly driving for Uber does to improve the
situations of women outside providing them with opportunities to earn income. Perhaps the most
egregious example of this conflation, however, is a video featuring a Saudi Arabian woman
named Badriyah. In this video, Uber makes a stunningly obtuse attempt at equating Saudi
women’s newly won right to drive with their ability to use this newfound right to drive for Uber.
This dynamic becomes readily apparent when Badriyah notes that “I feel happy transferring my
knowledge [of driving] and passing it down to other women who will then pass it on. It is the
pinnacle of happiness” (“Badriyah, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia” 2019). The freedom of movement
afforded by the legal right to drive is an unquestionably important development with myriad
implications in the lives of millions of Saudi women, and Uber’s attempt at insinuating the
ability to drive for Uber is in any way comparable in terms of the freedom it affords is not only
self-serving, but shockingly cynical as well.
Though gender-based narratives constituted roughly half of all YouTube “driver stories”
focused on empowerment, narratives of age and physical ability-based empowerment figured
prominently within this theme as well. The “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” website
features a similar number of empowerment-based narratives, with roughly one quarter of the
featured testimonials including this theme. However, all 19 testimonials that fit within this theme
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feature drivers who face obstacles stemming from their age or level of physical ability, with no
references to race, gender or sexuality-based difficulties in the job market. Within this group of
testimonials, stories of retirees unable to remain financially stable on a fixed income and those
who have limited job options due to a physical disability figure most prominently. Again, the
stark contrast between the narratives pushed and corporate identity assumed by Uber in the
context of a political campaign and those it adopts in general promotional efforts is notable.
Perhaps as a preemptive measure to avoid losing any measure of political support due to feelings
of latent sexism, racism, homophobia or transphobia amongst voters, it seems as though Uber is
focusing on narratives that empower those impacted by circumstances that transcend the
boundaries of race, gender and sexual identity - namely aging and physical disability. This
strategy, however, is more than an electoral safeguard against the potential bigotry of the voting
public. It is proof that Uber’s corporate identity will center the stories and champion the
empowerment of marginalized communities only when it is deemed economically or politically
beneficial for the company to do so. Thus, Uber’s public-facing identity is inherently amorphous
and intrinsically tied to economic concerns, undermining any expressed commitments to social
justice or equity that its advertisements and driver testimonials may express.

d. Uber’s Co-optation of Consumerist Rhetoric in Driver Communications
Though Uber clearly considers flexibility-based arguments to be the most politically
salient for preventing labor regulations, its marketing and policy teams routinely employ other
rhetorical strategies that significantly muddle the company’s message by describing drivers’
work with consumerist rhetoric. This thoroughly confounding trend is readily apparent in the
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company’s IPO prospectus, in which drivers are referred to in a number of seemingly conflicting
ways. In the prospectus’ glossary, drivers are clearly defined as “an independent driver or courier
who uses our platform to provide Ridesharing services, UberEats services, or both” (S-1 2019,
ii). However, just a few lines below this definition, drivers are also included in the definition of
the company’s “partners,” which supposedly include “any one of a Driver, restaurant, or shipper,
all of whom are our customers” (S-1 2019, ii). The final clause of the company-provided
definition of its “partners” introduces added uncertainty, as it essentially classifies all drivers,
restaurants and shippers that it does business with as both “partners” and “customers” without
providing any explanation or justification as to why both classifications include the exact same
groups of actors and what functional differences, if any, exist between these two classifications.
This delineation is further blurred by the fact that those who solicit rides or order food on the app
are referred to as its “consumers or end-users.” Though there technically is a difference between
“customers” and “consumers,” the two terms are used in largely similar manners in all but the
most formal circumstances, thus further complicating the perceived nature of both drivers and
riders’ relationship with the company. Finally, drivers also find themselves included in the
company’s definition of its “massive network,” which includes “tens of millions of Drivers,
consumers, restaurants, shippers, carriers, and dockless e-bikes and e-scooters, as well as
underlying data, technology, and shared infrastructure” (S-1 2019, 1). This grouping, which
equates the human actors who interact with the company to pieces of equipment owned by the
company, perhaps reveals the most about the true nature of Uber’s relationship with its drivers.
From a purely economic perspective, the company perceives its drivers as performing the
exact same function - transporting riders to their destination in the most convenient, rapid way
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possible - as the e-bikes, scooters and algorithmic technologies that the company owns. This
amoral perspective has deep roots in the company’s ethos, and can be traced back to co-founder
Travis Kalanick’s reported penchant for referring to the company’s drivers as its “supply,” a
term that even more directly equates the company’s workforce to its capital goods (Isaac 2019,
111). The use of this nomenclature reinforces perspectives and strategies that serve to
dehumanize drivers by considering their needs and desires in the same manner that one would
approach maintaining a piece of equipment - that is to say, providing them with the absolute
minimum level of resources and support needed for the continued performance of their assigned
task. This perspective has seemingly informed the general arc of Uber’s relationship with
drivers, only affording them additional workplace rights and autonomy when they are legally
obligated to do so or facing a public relations crisis deemed severe enough to elicit concessions.
The examples of such circumstances are myriad, and include instances discussed earlier in this
research, namely the company’s continued rollout of changes to fare structure and dispatch
systems in efforts to decrease the likelihood of AB5’s "ABC" test applying to its drivers. Though
this relational dynamic has long guided Uber’s internal calculus of its management of drivers,
recent driver-directed communications feature language and administrative programs that
seemingly serve to normalize these dynamics in the minds of drivers themselves.
The language that Uber has begun to adopt in recent blog posts aimed at its
California-based drivers display similar rhetorical intent to the terminology used in the
company’s IPO prospectus and other non-public facing communications. A relatively early
example of this is a blog post from July 2019 titled “Uber Pro: Summer of Rewards.” This post
outlines a program by which, for a limited time, drivers can access a number of perks like
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increased cash back on gasoline purchases, discounted rates on short term car rentals through
Fair, the company’s rental subsidiary, and the opportunity for drivers who’ve attained “Pro
Platinum Status or higher” to enter in a sweepstakes for a $5,000 United Airlines gift card, with
the number of entries per driver dictated by the number of rides they provide in a given time
frame (“Uber Pro: Summer of Rewards” 2019). Typically, rewards programs like the one
outlined in the “Summer of Rewards” blog post are marketed toward customers of a product or
service with the intention of incentivizing consistent patronage. This structure becomes
problematic, however, when applied to systems of independently contracted labor, as it creates
circumstances in which workers are incentivized to work consistently and in a specific fashion in
hopes of receiving “rewards,” while companies remain exempt from providing the
employment-related benefits that such consistent, structured work typically requires.
Such a tactic was also employed in the company’s “Keeping you in the driver’s seat, part
2” post from January 2020, wherein the company discussed a number of changes planned for its
“driver promotions.” The post noted that the company would be replacing a popular
“promotion” that rewarded drivers with extra money for completing a requisite number of
consecutive trips with a new “promotion” called “boost,” in which drivers can lower the
company’s “service fee” by “completing trips in certain locations during busy times of day” (“To
California Drivers: Keeping you in the driver’s seat, part 2” 2020). While the change was
marketed as beneficial to drivers’ earning potential and independence, the “boost promotion”
seemingly decreases drivers’ agency by explicitly coupling increased earning potential with
specific working hours. In doing so, Uber is establishing an incentive structure that acts as a sort
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of shadow schedule for drivers who most heavily rely on income earned from driving and
actively seek out ways to maximize their earnings.
Regardless of this policy change’s functional impact on drivers, which is likely to be
highly subjective, the usage of the term “promotion” in and of itself deserves additional scrutiny
in regards to its rhetorical effect. The usage of language like “promotion” that implies suggestion
rather than direction affords Uber the plausible deniability that drivers are not forced to adhere to
these constraints, even though they’re incentivized to. Similarly, this rhetorical framework
furthers the argument that drivers are consumers of Uber’s technology rather than the company’s
employees or even workers at all, thus theoretically affording them more autonomy over their
work outcomes than they truly have. Conversely, the threshold for what Uber is expected to
provide its drivers is lowered by this rhetoric, as positioning drivers as consumers rather than
workers or employees decouples drivers’ well-being from the company’s policies and actions.
This rhetoric works in concert with Uber’s self-appointed identity as a technology company
rather than a taxi company, wherein the company portrays its relationship with its drivers as
simply providing them a digital platform on which to build their own businesses. By focusing
this messaging in driver-directed blog posts, Uber is seemingly attempting to encourage drivers
to adopt a similar understanding of their relationship to the company, perhaps to temper their
expectations of what level of support they should expect from the company. Due to the fact that
these “promotions” and “rewards programs” are optional for drivers to participate in, Uber
maintains plausible deniability against allegations that it is coercing or forcefully dictating driver
behavior in any meaningful way, regardless of the fact that the financial incentives included in
such programs still serve to influence driver behavior and diminish driver agency.
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6. Significance
Though their ultimate efficacy remains unclear, the corporate identity-curating rhetorical,
legal and marketing strategies outlined and discussed above are liable to transcend the specific
case of Uber and its fellow TNCs in California. As the algorithmic technologies that govern
app-based work become increasingly sophisticated, they are being applied to an increasingly
wide array of industries’ systems of labor administration, thus impacting the lives of an ever
larger portion of the workforce. In a sense, the digital underpinnings of such labor systems act as
a sort of smokescreen that obscures the clear lines that traditionally exist between workplace
autonomy and organizational control, between consumer and worker. Further, these
decentralized, app-based systems may contribute to and exacerbate the ongoing outsourcing of
white collar and administrative work from high-wage nations like the United States and Canada
into locales largely in the Global South with lower wage levels and less robust labor protections.
The political, social and economic implications of labor outsourcing in a heavily globalized
economic system are immense and deserve more scrutiny then can be afforded in this research
alone.
The benefits of administering a workforce of independently-contracted laborers through a
digital interface from a corporate financial standpoint also play into the significance of this
research. To be sure, the cost savings involved with eschewing traditional employment
agreements for independent contract labor have been clear to corporations for decades, and it
should be expected that the allure of such savings will continue to encourage more corporations
to adopt this labor structure. While this practice is lucrative for the corporations that wish to
enlist it, reliance on independent contract labor can lead to significant declines in tax revenue for
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all levels of government. California alone loses roughly $7 billion in payroll tax revenue
annually due to worker misclassification (Bhuiyan et al, 2019). This figure does not account for
the additional costs the State incurs due to its provision of food stamps, medical care and other
safety net benefits for independent contractors that do not have these needs adequately covered
through their TNC work (Bhuiyan et al, 2019). This unilaterally-decided passing along of
responsibility from corporation to government is inexcusable and staggeringly immoral, as it
essentially holds the State’s taxpayers accountable for Uber’s illegal business practices and the
resulting neglect of its workers.
What’s more, it seems as though Uber’s terms of engagement regarding the issue of
driver classification, informed by its messaging and framing around the “Protect App Based
Drivers and Services Act,” are already being adopted by news media outlets throughout
California. While California’s largest news outlets like the San Francisco Chronicle and the Los
Angeles Times have maintained largely objective coverage of the issue, dozens of local daily and
weekly newspapers throughout the state have adopted a rather oppositional stance to the law and
have communicated this opposition using rhetoric and framing strikingly similar to that of Uber
and its fellow TNCs. The three examples of such pieces from the Daily News of Los Angeles, the
Sacramento Bee and the Torrance Daily Breeze included in the findings section of this capstone
represent only a small fraction of the overall output I came across throughout my research
process.
More notable than the mere existence of such articles, however, are the patterns that
emerge among the outlets that most often publish such content. Virtually all of the anti-AB5 and
pro-TNC pieces I came across, and two of the three noted in this research, were published by
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outlets owned by the same media conglomerate, Digital First Media, which owns 39 daily and
weekly outlets throughout California and 98 outlets nationwide (Digital First Media, n.d.). The
fact that many of the outlets the conglomerate owns heavily rely on independent contractors and
freelance writers and would see costs rise if their workers were deemed employees by AB5’s
“ABC” test at least partially explains the coordinated nature of this opposition (“Editorial - Don’t
let AB5 take away your Newspaper”). The considerable reach of Digital First Media’s
properties, which blanket the state from Eureka to Orange County, coupled with the
conglomerate’s vested interest in returning to a pre-AB5 regulatory structure, makes it very
likely that we will continue to see waves of anti-AB5 stories from Digital First-owned outlets as
the battle over worker classification continues. To communicate this opposition with subtlety,
Digital First Media solicits opinion pieces written by policy analysts at right wing and libertarian
think tanks and syndicates them throughout its subsidiary properties, which was the case for the
Daily Breeze and Daily News of Los Angeles pieces cited earlier in this research (National
Taxpayers Union Foundation, n.d.; Competitive Enterprise Institute, n.d.). This tactic has two
primary goals: to communicate the conglomorate’s desired message to as wide a swath of
California’s population as possible and launder the piece’s bias due to the common perception
amongst media consumers that local outlets are less biased than their national counterparts
(Brenan 2019). Ultimately, the expansive yet subtle nature Digital First Media’s efforts coupled
with those of Uber and its fellow TNCs in mounting the “Protect App Based Drivers and
Services” campaign makes for a media environment rife with the same misconceptions and
oversimplifications regarding worker classification that have long informed Uber’scorporate
identity.
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If Uber’s strategies for preventing the reclassification of its independently contracted
drivers ultimately prove successful, they may serve as a blueprint for future anti-regulatory
campaigns waged by companies that rely on independently contracted labor. While there are
many unique elements in Uber’s case, namely its immense financial resources and its role as a
primary form of transportation in many urban centers nationwide, the corporate identity-curating
marketing and advertising strategies it has utilized hinge on rhetorical appeals with wide
applicability. The appeals to flexibility and freedom that dominate the “Protect App Based
Drivers and Services” website testimonials, the usage of consumerist rhetoric in
workforce-facing and workforce-referencing communications as well as the conflation of
efficiency-seeking tactics with progressive ideology are all aspects of Uber’s strategy that are
applicable across industry lines. This research’s attempts to accentuate the inconsistencies,
disconnect from material reality and overall duplicity of Uber’s strategy is intended to equip the
public and regulators alike with the tools necessary to engage with such strategies in ways that
are adequately critical and commensurate with the complex, nuanced nature of worker
classification. Acceptance of Uber’s terms of engagement - be it tacit or explicit - serves to
grossly oversimplify issues that impact the well-being of hundreds of thousands of working and
middle class individuals for the sole benefit of a massively wealthy corporation masquerading as
an engine of popular economic self-sufficiency and democratization.
This research is intended to compliment the important work of numerous legal scholars,
journalists, social scientists and labor activists the world over who’ve focused their research on
the legal and technological means by which Uber has attempted to prevent the regulation of its
labor practices. In examining the nature of Uber’s legal strategies and the technologies that
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underpin the company’s system of worker administration, these scholars have shed light on two
major facets of the company’s overarching strategy to combat regulation. What remains
under-examined - and what this research aims to account for - is the role that Uber’s attempts at
curating its corporate identity through driver and public-facing communications play within this
strategy. While legal arguments and systems of algorithmic management can placate regulators’
concerns to a certain degree, they do not do the work of manufacturing consent and support
amongst Uber’s customers and drivers in the manner that the company’s rhetorical and
advertising strategies do. Such strategies serve to compliment the company’s legal and
technological practices by attempting to normalize and legitimize them on a wider societal level.
It is my hope that the findings of this research will call this normalization and legitimization into
question through its critical analysis and empirical findings.

7. Conclusion
As my findings and analysis have evidenced, there remain many uncertainties regarding
the future of TNC driver employment classification in California, particularly with respect to the
applicability of AB5’s "ABC" test to these workers. Whether the “Protect App Based Drivers
and Services Act” secures TNCs’ exemption from AB5 or AB5’s "ABC" test finds these
companies’ drivers to be employees, pivotal questions remain regarding the enforcement of these
regulations, the impact they may have on wider transportation systems as well as their impact on
drivers themselves. Uber and its fellow TNCs have already shown the proclivity to challenge
these laws’ application to their workers through litigation as well as legislation, signaling that
this dispute will not be decided quickly or easily. What is abundantly clear, however, is that the
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nature of the driver-TNC relationship in California will not revert to its original form after this
dispute is settled. In order to ensure that the end result of this dispute is as equitable and
reflective of drivers’ workplace realities as possible, my first policy recommendation is for the
State of California to immediately mandate that all algorithms and mathematical models that
administer and manage structures of labor be made available for regulatory oversight.
TNCs’ algorithms are currently protected from public view and regulatory oversight by
intellectual property law, which is administered on the federal level by the Department of
Commerce and thus can only be changed through congressional action. A mandate of
algorithmic transparency will accomplish two concurrent goals. First, allowing regulators and
third party experts to examine the inner mechanisms of these algorithms will work to eliminate
virtually all uncertainties regarding the extent and nature of control that TNCs enjoy over their
drivers. Legal protections allow companies like Uber to create so-called “black boxes” around
their driver dispatch algorithms, which essentially allow them to obscure their governing
principles and the manner(s) by which they administer and manage drivers’ work, revealing only
the end results to those outside the company. This blanket protection has been the root cause of
the ongoing uncertainties over driver classification, with TNCs simultaneously claiming that
their drivers are wholly independent actors while refusing to share details regarding their
dispatch algorithms. Allowing regulators and third party experts access to TNCs dispatch
algorithms in their entirety is the only way that TNCs can be judged by AB5’s "ABC" test with
full certainty. Without such access, TNCs retain the plausible deniability that their dispatch
algorithms do not unduly constrain the actions of their drivers and regulators are forced to
enforce employment law through guesswork and speculation.
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The second goal that mandating algorithmic transparency would accomplish is less case
specific and holds primarily long term implications. Such a policy would provide the impetus for
a more comprehensive apparatus to regulate the design and function of all algorithms that
administer and manage labor. In other words, once more is learned about these algorithms’
inner-workings, regulatory bodies can then begin to identify any structural features of these
algorithms that might allow violations of established labor law including discriminatory
practices, illegal working conditions and wage theft. Despite the severe nature of this policy, it is
not without precedent. For decades, taxi companies operated under heavy regulation that
systematized their fare structure, qualifications for drivers and even the number of cars legally
allowed to operate in a locality at a given time. Though such regulations likely hamstrung
individual taxi companies’ profitability and their owners’ autonomy to a certain degree, they
were not without their benefits. Holding drivers to a common standard of background checks and
behind-the-wheel competency decided by impartial third parties ensures a favorable and uniform
level of service. Limits to the number of taxis in a given locality allowed drivers stable and
adequate earnings. Uniform fare structures not only eliminated guesswork from customers’
perspective, but was inherently more transparent than algorithmically-generated pricing.
Exposing TNCs to similar regulations, especially if they are decided upon in a manner that
welcomes drivers, regulators and advocates’ input, would serve to democratize a system that has
until now been unilaterally controlled by TNCs’ executives and board members.
In the absence of federally-mandated algorithmic transparency and oversight, there
remain ways by which state governments can empower municipalities to regulate the actions of
TNCs within their jurisdictions. This process has already begun in California, as one of AB5’s
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provisions grants the City Attorneys of California’s “big four” municipalities - San Francisco,
San Jose, Los Angeles and San Diego - power to sue over allegations of TNC worker
misclassification within their respective jurisdictions (Bhuiyan 2019). This provision of AB5 is a
step toward a more democratic regulatory structure, as all four cities’ attorneys are elected by
constituents rather than appointed by their respective mayors and thus more beholden to public
scrutiny and pressure. This step is insufficient, however, because it leaves the decision of
whether or not to regulate up to the discretion of one person, and many city attorneys have been
noncommittal regarding their willingness to harness this newfound power (Bollag 2019).
From 2013 until AB5’s passage in September 2019, the California Public Utilities
Commission, or CPUC, was the sole regulatory authority over TNCs in California. The CPUC is
a considerably flawed regulatory body, as its Board of Commissioners consists of only five
members who are appointed by the Governor rather than elected by constituents and are charged
with overseeing the (“Commissioners” 2020). These features do now endow the CPUC with the
level of capacity to adequately oversee the operations of such a dynamic industry in a state as
large and diverse as California, where transportation conditions can vary significantly from city
to city and county to county. To be sure, the fact that the CPUC Commission currently serves at
the behest of Governor Gavin Newsom, who has thus far proven dedicated to combating worker
misclassification and reigning in TNCs’ actions, is cause for cautious optimism regarding the
CPUC’s willingness and capacity to regulate going forward (Newsom 2019). The appointed
nature of this commission, however, makes its mission and level of empowerment largely up to
the discretion of future Governors who may guide the commission’s actions and agenda in
conflicting ways based upon their respective relationships with and attitudes toward the TNC
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industry.
The CPUC’s inadequacy as a regulatory body coupled with the promising start afforded
by AB5’s empowerment of city attorneys brings me to my second policy recommendation,
which is to further shift regulatory authority over TNCs in California from the state to the local
level. The least drastic element of such a shift would be the empowerment of the “big four”
municipalities’ respective offices of labor standards to assist their city attorneys’ TNC worker
classification suits. Although the city attorneys of these cities undoubtedly have ample and
capable staffs of their own, they do not likely have the same level of expertise on
employment-related matters as their counterparts in the offices of labor standards. I propose not
for the offices of labor standards to take this responsibility from city attorneys altogether, but
rather for the two bodies to collaborate in the interest of expanding the municipality’s overall
capacity in handling such issues, which stand to be rather complicated and intensive given the
secretive and decentralized nature of TNCs’ operations. Offices of labor standards would be
especially helpful in the investigatory and enforcement aspects of oversight, as this is already a
large part of their standard operations. To be sure, robust formal channels of communication
between city attorneys offices and offices of labor standards must be established for such a
collaboration to be successful, and the offices of labor standards would need to increase their
staffing levels to accommodate for this new responsibility while retaining the capacity to
perform their pre-existing duties.
The more extreme and likely controversial aspect of this shift would be the empowerment
of the “big four” municipalities’ transportation agencies to regulate TNCs’ operations within
their jurisdictions. Until this point, these agencies have been forced to design and administer
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their programs with only estimates of how TNCs’ presence in their city would factor into such
plans. A large TNC presence in a city has been found to significantly alter traffic patterns as well
as public transit and taxi usage, making the access to data regarding TNCs’ own operational
patterns vital to the design of a cohesive and efficient city-wide transportation system (Clelow
and Mishla 2018, 5; Bliss 2019). This empowerment, however, would largely depend on the
ability of municipal governments to access such data, which has traditionally been met with stiff
opposition from TNCs.
Although TNCs must submit reports on the identities of drivers, the number of accessible
vehicles in operation, “problems with drivers” and each driver’s total hours and miles driven to
the CPUC annually, the CPUC is not required and has been unwilling to share such data with
individual municipalities (“Required Reports” 2020). This is counterproductive, as municipal
transportation agencies not only tend to be more attuned to the specific needs and realities of
their jurisdictions’ transportation system than state-level bodies like the CPUC, but have the
legal capability to alter such systems as well. In the current regulatory environment, the data
supplied to the CPUC is being under-utilized and would be far more impactful in terms of
improving California’s urban transportation systems if municipal transportation agencies were
allowed access to it. A similar logic applies to the data collected by the CPUC regarding the
miles driven and hours worked by each TNC driver in the state. Though the CPUC has access to
such valuable data, which could serve to help solve driver misclassification claims or other
employment-related disputes, the fact that the it is unwilling and unrequired to share this data
with the entities that have the capability to enforce California’s labor laws, like city attorneys and
offices of labor standards, renders the data virtually useless.
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Essentially, the efficacy of such a shift from state to municipal level TNC regulatory
oversight is dependent on municipalities’ ability to access the data currently held by the CPUC
and use it to inform their regulatory decision making. Altering TNCs’ reporting requirements so
that municipal transportation agencies and offices of labor standards rather than the CPUC
receive this crucial data would be a crucial first step toward establishing a more proactive,
empowered and detail-oriented regulatory environment for TNCs in California. This data,
however, is merely the output produced by the various features and mechanisms within TNCs’
dispatch algorithms, which ultimately hold the key to proper driver classification and municipal
transportation planning. Comprehensive regulatory power over TNCs would entail both
oversight of TNC dispatch algorithms and municipal government access to the data produced by
those algorithmically made decisions. To be sure, many of the less densely populated areas of the
state may lack the governmental capacity to adequately carry out such regulatory responsibilities
on the municipal level. However, such areas also tend to have less complex transportation needs
and a considerably smaller TNC presence than their urban counterparts. For such areas, I
recommend TNC oversight be administered on the county rather than municipal level, so as to
expand regulatory capacity and diffuse costs.
Ultimately, the rise of Uber and TNCs as a whole represent what I believe to be an
overcorrection from a centrally-regulated and administered taxi system that, despite its flaws,
ensured stability for company owners and drivers alike to a TNC system that leaves the
well-being of both drivers and customers to the discretion of a small number of immensely
powerful, unaccountable and amoral corporations. Processes that were once subject to
wide-ranging scrutiny and regulation have been co-opted and completely obscured by private
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entities who’ve repurposed them in pursuit of revenue and growth maximization. To be sure,
TNCs have pursued this goal largely through the prioritization of rider convenience, which has
created a system that is markedly more user-friendly from a consumer perspective. However, a
number of other considerations - from the economic stability of workers to the safety of riders
and drivers alike - have been systematically suppressed by these companies. Re-orienting the
TNC industry to properly value goals other than growing individual companies’ revenue will
require regulators and lawmakers to make difficult, likely unpopular, but necessary value
judgments between the importance of preserving the secrecy of corporate intellectual property or
ensuring the safety, economic stability and sustainability of a system that millions of people rely
on daily.
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Appendix A: Driver Survey
This past summer, Uber and Lyft sent their California drivers messages regarding AB5, a law
that could reclassify drivers as employees if it passed. The goal of this survey is to learn your
thoughts and opinions about these messages, their appropriateness and persuasiveness.
I am a graduate student researcher in the Urban & Public Affairs Program at the University of
San Francisco. I am part of a cohort of students working on public policy research and I am
currently conducting a research project that examines drivers’ responses to Uber and Lyfts’
sending them messages about schedule flexibility and Assembly Bill 5. This form only applies to
research subjects who are 18 or older.
I am asking you to participate in a 10 minute long survey about your experience/knowledge of
urban policy, specifically driving for Uber and/or Lyft. Your participation in this project is
completely voluntary and you can choose to end the survey at any time, with no repercussions of
any kind. There are no known risks involved in this study. You will not receive compensation for
this study. The study is intended to benefit broader public knowledge about this policy topic.
Protecting your identity: Your responses will be used to support research on drivers’ responses to
Uber and Lyfts’ sending them messages about schedule flexibility and Assembly Bill 5 that may
be shared with the general public. Any and all information collected that reflects your identity
(name, title, place of work, etc) will be kept strictly confidential.
With your permission, this researcher may contact you again with follow-up or clarifying
questions.
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All records from this research will be maintained by the researcher in a confidential location on
the USF campus, with guidance from my faculty sponsors. If you have any questions, please
contact UPA program director Rachel Brahinsky. See above & below for contact information.
Sincerely,
Benjamin Peterson
Questions:
Student researcher contact information: Benjamin Peterson, brpeterson2@usfca.edu.
(650)703-4148
UPA Faculty Director Rachel Brahinsky, rbrahinsky@usfca.edu. 415-422-2667.
USF Office for Research on Human Subjects: irbphs@usfca.edu.

Question 1: After reading the above description, do you agree to participate in the following
survey?
● Yes
● No
Question 2: If you would be willing to participate in an interview, please share your preferred
contact information below (short free response- optional)

Section 2: Demographics
Question 3: What is your age?
● 18-24

● 45-54

● 25-34

● 55-64

● 35-44

● 65+
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Question 3: Please state your ethnicity/s (short free response - optional)
Question 4: What gender do you identify as?
● Male

● Gender Non-Conforming

● Female

● Prefer not to say

Question 5: What companies do you work for? (check all that apply)
● Uber

● Private Black Car Service

● Lyft

● Other

Question 6: How long have you worked for Uber and/or Lyft?
● Less than 6 months

● 2-3 years

● 6 months-1 year

● More than 3 year

● 1-2 years
Question 6: How many hours per week do you drive for these companies?
● 0-10 hours

● 30-40 hours

● 10-20 hours

● More than 40 hours

● 20-30 hours
Question 7: Is driving your main source of income?
● Yes
● No
Question 8: Do you remember Uber or Lyft sending you messages about “protecting driver
flexibility” in the past year?
● Yes
● No
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*Those who answered “Yes” to question 8 proceeded to section 3, while those who answered
“No” skipped section 3 and proceeded to section 4*

Section 3: Messaging
Question 9: Where did you receive these messages? (check all that apply)

● My Uber/Lyft driver app

● Text Message

● Email

● Other

Question 10: How many of these messages did you receive?
● 1

● 4

● 2

● 5

● 3

● Not Sure

Question 11: Did any of these messages ask you to sign a petition?
● Yes
● No
● Not Sure
Question 12: What did you think these messages were about when you first saw them? (short
free response)
Question 13: How clear was it that these messages were about a specific law? (sliding scale 1-5:
1 being very unclear, 5 being very clear)
Question 14: Did you feel pressure to agree with the point of view expressed in these messages?
● Yes
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● No
● It Depends
Question 15: Have Uber or Lyft ever offered you money to attend a protest?
● Yes
● No
● Not Sure

Question 16: How much did these messages impact your opinion on schedule flexibility? (sliding
scale 1-5: 1 being very little impact, 5 being a significant impact)

Section 4: Appropriateness
Question 17: In general, do you think it is appropriate for companies to send their workers
messages about politics?
● Yes
● No

● Only if it impacts the company as a
whole

● Only if it’s relevant to their job
Question 18: If an employer sent you messages about politics, would you feel pressure to agree
with their point of view?
● Yes
● No
● It Depends
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Section 5: Opinions on Assembly Bill 5
Question 19: What parts of your work do you think will be impacted if you’re classified as an
employee? (check all that apply)
● Rate of pay
● Schedule flexibility
● Access to benefits

● Ability to voice your concerns,
desires and needs
● Other

Question 20: Would you rather be classified as an independent contractor or employee?
● Independent contractor
● Employee
● No strong preference
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Appendix B: “Protect App Based Drivers and Services” Testimonial Analysis
Theme

Number of Mentions

Percent of Total

flexibility for family
responsibilities

34

47.89%

flexibility for career/academic

12

16.90%
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pursuit
flexibility as most
important/only reason this
person drives

5

7.04%

11

15.49%

lack of other job opportunities

5

7.04%

disability/physical toll of other
jobs unsuitable

11

15.49%

"extra cash"

12

16.90%

money for essentials
(rent/food/etc)

12

16.90%

high cost of living

6

8.45%

money for specific
non-essential goal/purpose

2

2.82%

"be my own boss"

6

8.45%

"right to work"

2

2.82%

mention of
leisure/lifestyle/desire to work
at will

7

9.86%

full time driver

4

5.63%

part time driver

17

23.94%

2

2.82%

retirement

mentions
social/personal/non-econ
benefits

